Repugnance and consequence-insensitivity (in connection to opposition to genetically-engineered food)

 There is a well developed literature on repugnance connected to food, and here is a recent, interesting example that focuses on the relationship between consequence-insensitivity and other correlates of moral outrage.

Inbar, Yoel, Sydney E. Scott, and Paul Rozin. "Moral opposition to genetically engineered food in the United States, France, and Germany." Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (2025). 

 ABSTRACT: "When people are morally opposed to a practice, they often profess to be consequence-insensitive—that is, they say that they think it ought to be prohibited regardless of the risks and benefits. We investigate consequence-insensitive opposition to genetically engineered (GE) food in France, Germany, and the United States. Using nationally representative samples (total N = 1599), we find that most GE food opponents in all three countries are consequence-insensitive (France: 93.1%; Germany: 87.4%; United States: 81.3%). Consequence-insensitive opponents differ from other opponents in other ways consistent with their holding moral beliefs. They are more likely to display other properties of sacred moral values, like quantity insensitivity and universalism. They also see GE food as more personally important, are less willing to consume it, are more in favor of policies restricting it, and are more willing to engage in activism against it."

 

"In their research on moral GE food opposition in the United States, Scott et al. [15] asked par “It is equally wrong to allow some of this to happen as to allow twice as much to happen. The amount doesn't matter” (quantity insensitivity); and “This would be wrong even in a country where everyone thought it was not wrong” (universalism)ticipants three questions that were originally developed by Baron and Spranca [14] for their research on sacred values (which they call “protected values”). Scott et al.’s primary analyses focused on the consequence-insensitivity question, which asked whether GE food “should be prohibited no matter how great the benefits and minor the risks from allowing it.” Likewise, we here focus on the consequence-insensitivity item and test whether responses to other questions theoretically related to sacred values differ between consequence-sensitive and consequence-insensitive opponents. In the current study, we used two other items related to sacred values that were previously used in Scott et al.: “It is equally wrong to allow some of this to happen as to allow twice as much to happen. The amount doesn't matter” (quantity insensitivity); and “This would be wrong even in a country where everyone thought it was not wrong” (universalism). We also added two new exploratory items that were intended to tap moral outrage at the juxtaposition of secular (financial) considerations with sacred values [19]: “I am offended by the idea of putting a monetary price on allowing this”; and “It is morally wrong to put a monetary price on allowing this practice.” For each of these items, we test whether responses differ between consequence-sensitive and consequence-insensitive opponents. If consequence-insensitive opponents are more likely to display quantity insensitivity, universalism, and moral outrage at sacred-secular tradeoffs than consequence-sensitive opponents, then this would provide further evidence that consequence-insensitive opponents moralize GE food more than consequence-sensitive opponents."