Friday, October 28, 2016

NBER Market Design meeting at Stanford: Oct 28-9

Market Design Working Group Meeting
Michael Ostrovsky and Parag Pathak, Organizers
October 28-29, 2016
SIEPR
Koret-Taube Conference Center
Stanford University
366 Galvez Street
Stanford, CA
 
Friday, October 28


8:30 am
Continental Breakfast
9:00 am
Darrell Duffie, Stanford University and NBER
Haoxiang Zhu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
Size Discovery
Ahmad Peivandi, Georgia State University
Participation and Unbiased Pricing in CDS Settlement Mechanisms
10:30 am
Break
11:00 am
Hugo Hopenhayn, University of California at Los Angeles and NBER
Maryam Saeedi, Carnegie Mellon University
Bidding Dynamics in Auctions
12:30 pm
Lunch
2:00 pm
Christina Aperjis, Power Auctions LLC
Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland
Oleg Baranov, University of Colorado Boulder
Thayer Morrill, North Carolina State University
Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns
Tibor Heumann, Princeton University
Ascending Auctions with Multidimensional Signals
3:30 pm
Break
4:00 pm
John Hatfield, University of Texas at Austin
Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University
Hidden Substitutes

Paul Milgrom, Stanford University
Deferred Acceptance Auctions Without Substitutes
5:30 pm
Adjourn
6:30 pm
Dinner
Il Fornaio Restaurant
520 Cowper Street
Palo Alto, CA

Saturday, October 29


8:30 am
Continental Breakfast
9:00 am
Gabriel Carroll, Stanford University
Ilya Segal, Stanford University
Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities
Songzi Du, Simon Fraser University
Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
10:30 am
Break
11:00 am
Shengwu Li, Stanford University
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Marek Pycia, University of California at Los Angeles
Peter Troyan, University of Virginia
Obvious Dominance and Random Priority
12:30 pm
Lunch
2:00 pm
Benjamin Roth, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Ran Shorrer, Pennsylvania State University
Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon-Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design
Michal Feldman, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Nicole Immorlica, Northwestern University
Brendan Lucier, Microsoft Research
Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University
Vasilis Syrgkanis, Microsoft Research
Efficiency Guarantees in Large Markets
3:30 pm
Break
4:00 pm
David Delacretaz, University of Melbourne
Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University
Alexander Teytelboym, University of Oxford
Refugee Resettlement

Tommy Andersson, Lund University
Lars Ehlers, Université de Montréal
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings
5:30 pm
Adjourn

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