Sunday, July 20, 2014

Dynamic Games, Contracts, and Markets at Stanford SITE, July 21-23

STANFORD INSTITUTE FOR THEORETICAL ECONOMICS (SITE)
Session 3: Dynamic Games, Contracts, and Markets

Monday, July 21, 2014

8:30 am to 9:00 am
Check-in and Breakfast
9:00 am to 9:45 am
Dynamic Trading: Price Inertia, Front-Running and Relationship Banking
Presented by: Yuliy Sannikov, Princeton University
Co-Authors: Andy Skrzypacz, Stanford University
9:45 am to 10:00 am
Coffee Break
10:00 am to 10:45 am
Dynamic Ex Post Equilibrium, Welfare, and Optimal Trading Frequency in Double Auctions
Presented by: Songzi Du, Simon Fraser University; Haoxiang Zhu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
10:45 am to 11:00 am
Coffee Break
11:00 am to 11:45 am
TBA
Presented by: Zhiguo He, University of Chicago
11:45 am to 1:30 pm
Lunchtime Discussion
1:30 pm to 2:15 pm
Labor Union Members Play an OLG Repeated Game
Presented by: Michihiro Kandori, University of Tokyo; Shinya Obayashi, Tohoku University
2:15 pm to 2:30 pm
Coffee Break
2:30 pm to 3:15 pm
Perfect Versus Imperfect Monitoring in Repeated Games
Presented by: Takuo Sugaya, Stanford University; Alexander Wolitzky, Stanford University
3:15 pm to 3:30 pm
Coffee Break
3:30 pm to 4:15 pm
Reputation Without Commitment
Presented by: Jonathan Weinstein, Northwestern University; Muhamet Yildiz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
6:00 pm to 8:30 pm
Dinner

Tuesday, July 22, 2014

8:30 am to 9:00 am
Check-in and Breakfast
9:00 am to 9:45 am
The Value of a Reputation Under Imperfect Monitoring
Presented by: Martin Cripps, University College London; Eduardo Faingold, Yale University
9:45 am to 10:00 am
Coffee Break
10:00 am to 10:45 am
A Reputational Theory of Firm Dynamics
Presented by: Simon Board, University of California, Los Angeles; Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, University of California, Los Angeles
10:45 am to 11:00 am
Coffee Break
11:00 am to 11:45 am
Managerial Attention and Worker Engagement
Presented by: Marina Halac, Columbia Business School; Andrea Prat, Columbia University
11:45 am to 1:30 pm
Lunchtime Discussion
1:30 pm to 2:15 pm
Beeps
Presented by: Jeff Ely, Northwestern University
2:15 pm to 2:30 pm
Coffee Break
2:30 pm to 3:15 pm
Dynamic Delegation of Experimentation
Presented by: Yingni Guo, Northwestern University
3:15 pm to 3:30 pm
Coffee Break
3:30 pm to 4:15 pm
Optimal Design of Internal Disclosure
Presented by: Dmitry Orlov, Stanford University
6:00 pm to 8:30 pm
Dinner

Wednesday, July 23, 2014

8:30 am to 9:00 am
Check-in and Breakfast
9:00 am to 9:45 am
Auctions with Limited Commitment
Presented by: Konrad Mierendorff, University of Zurich
Co-Authors: Qingmin Liu, Columbia University; Xianwen Shi, University of Toronto
9:45 am to 10:00 am
Coffee Break
10:00 am to 10:45 am
Dynamic Eliciting Unobservable Information
Presented by: Nicolas Lambert, Stanford University
Co-Authors: Christopher Chambers, University of California, San Diego
10:45 am to 11:00 am
Coffee Break
11:00 am to 11:45 am
Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure
Presented by: Sylvain Chassang, Princeton University; Juan Ortner, Boston University
11:45 am to 1:30 pm
Lunchtime Discussion
1:30 pm to 2:15 pm
Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market
Presented by: Leo Kaas, University of Konstanz
Co-Authors: Philipp Kircher, University of Edinburgh
2:15 pm to 2:30 pm
Coffee Break
2:30 pm to 3:15 pm
Optimal Financial Regulation and the Concentration of Aggregate Risk
Presented by: Sebastian Di Tella, Stanford University
3:15 pm to 3:30 pm
Coffee Break
3:30 pm to 4:15 pm
Dynamic Markets for Lemons: Performance, Liquidity, and Policy Intervention
Presented by: Diego Moreno, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; John Wooders, University of Technology Sydney

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