No Prices No Games! Four Economic Models by Michael Richter and Ariel Rubinstein

 Here's a new book on economic theory by Richter and Rubinstein.

No Prices No Games!  Four Economic Models  by Michael Richter and Ariel Rubinstein  

At the link you can download a pdf or read it online for free, or purchase a printed edition.

"While current economic theory focuses on prices and games, this book models economic settings where harmony is established through one of the following societal conventions:

• A power relation according to which stronger agents are able to force weaker ones to do things against their will.

• A norm that categorizes actions as permissible or forbidden.

• A status relation over alternatives which limits each agent's choices.

• Systematic biases in agents' preferences.

"These four conventions are analysed using simple and mathematically straightforward models, without any pretensions regarding direct applied usefulness. While we do not advocate for the adoption of any of these conventions specifically – we do advocate that when modelling an economic situation, alternative equilibrium notions should be considered, rather than automatically reaching for the familiar approaches of prices or games."

By email, Ariel tells me that he designed the cover.

Contents

0. Introduction

(pp. 1–12)

• Michael Richter
• Ariel Rubinstein

1. Equilibrium in the Jungle

(pp. 13–36)

• Michael Richter
• Ariel Rubinstein

2. The Permissible and the Forbidden

(pp. 37–64)

• Michael Richter
• Ariel Rubinstein

3. Status and Indoctrination

(pp. 65–90)

• Michael Richter
• Ariel Rubinstein

4. Biased Preferences Equilibrium

(pp. 91–110)

• Michael Richter
• Ariel Rubinstein

5. A Comparison to Game Theory

(pp. 111–133)

• Michael Richter
• Ariel Rubinstein
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"In the final chapter, we compare this book's modeling approaches with each other and to those of standard Game Theory on two ``battlegrounds''.

The first is the matching economy. An even-sized population of agents must match into exclusive pairs (pairings). Each agent possesses a preference relation over potential mates.

The standard cooperative game theory solution concept for matching economies is ``pairwise stability''. Following Richter and Rubinstein (2024), we compare this concept with the jungle equilibrium, the Y-equilibrium and the status and initial status equilibrium concepts.

The second battleground is a ``political economy'' situation. A group of agents hold views on a political issue. Each agent chooses a position and has preferences only regarding the position he himself chooses (and not the choices of others). However, there is a need that a majority of agents choose the same position.

Traditionally, such a situation is modeled as a non-cooperative game and its Nash equilibria are calculated. Extending Richter and Rubinstein (2021), we compare this approach with the convex Y-equilibrium and the biased preferences equilibria.

On both battlegrounds, the new approaches lead to very different outcomes than the traditional ones."