Signaling in the markets for new doctors

 Signaling of interest is catching on in medical labor markets for residents and fellows.

Here's some material from Thalamus (which describes itself as "Complete GME interview management solution for applicants & programs. Easy, secure, and automated interview scheduling to optimize in-person & virtual recruitment.")

The Ultimate Guide to Preference Signaling for Medical Residency Applicants and Programs 2022-2023.

• Part 1: Introduces the history of preference signaling.
• Part 2: Describes its introduction to GME.
• Part 3: Discusses outcomes to date.
• Part 4: Provides advice for applicants and programs.
• Part 5: Describes how Thalamus will support this initiative.

It all seems to have started with the signaling mechanism we use in Economics.

From Part 1: 

"The Emergence of Preference Signaling:

Preference signaling was first implemented in 2006, as part of the recruitment process for economics graduate students administered through the American Economics Association (AEA). Since then, there have been several useful studies analyzing this process by leading economists at institutions including Harvard and Stanford. These include “Preference Signaling in Matching Markets” and “The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective.”

"Of note, one of the authors on the latter article is Dr. Alvin E. Roth, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics for proving certain key attributes of the matching algorithm that is used today by the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), where Dr. Roth currently serves as a board member. This article has been cited in papers throughout GME that examine preference signaling in specialties including Otolaryngology and Orthopaedic Surgery."

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Earlier:

Sunday, November 15, 2009

Signaling for interviews in the Economics Job Market: Registration opens tomorrow