Stanford SITE seminar: Experimental Economics, August 12-13

 

SITE 2021 PROGRAM

Session 5: Experimental Economics

Date

Thursday, August 12, 2021, 9am - Friday, August 13, 2021, 1pm

Location

Zoom

ORGANIZED BY

• Christine Exley, Harvard Business School
• Muriel Niederle, Stanford University
• Alejandro Martínez Marquina, Stanford University
• Alvin Roth, Stanford University
• Lise Vesterlund, University of Pittsburgh

This workshop will be dedicated to advances in experimental economics combining laboratory and field-experimental methodologies with theoretical and psychological insights on decision-making, strategic interaction and policy. We would invite papers in lab experiments, field experiments and their combination that test theory, demonstrate the importance of psychological phenomena, and explore social and policy issues. In addition to senior faculty members, invited presenters will include junior faculty as well as graduate students.  

In This Session

Thursday, August 12, 2021

AUG 12

9:00 AM - 9:30 AM

Increasing the Demand for Workers with a Criminal Record

Presented by: Dorothea Kübler (WZB Berlin and TU Berlin)

Co-author(s): Hande Erkut (WZB Berlin)

AUG 12

9:30 AM - 10:00 AM

What Money Can Buy: How Market Exchange Promotes Values

Presented by: Roberto Weber (University of Zurich)

Co-author(s): Sili Zhang (University of Zurich)

AUG 12

10:00 AM - 10:30 AM

Your Place in the World - Relative Income and Global Inequality

Presented by: Johanna Mollerstrom (George Mason University)

Co-author(s): Dietmar Fehr (University of Heidelberg) and Ricardo Perez-Truglia (University of California Berkeley)

AUG 12

10:30 AM - 11:00 AM

Break

AUG 12

11:00 AM - 11:30 AM

Increasing the Demand for Workers with a Criminal Record

Presented by: Mitchell Hoffman (University of Toronto)

Co-author(s): Shai Bernstein (Harvard Business School), Emanuele Colonnelli (University of Chicago Booth), and Benjamin Iverson (Brigham Young University)

AUG 12

11:30 AM - 11:45 AM

Why High Incentives Cause Repugnance: A Framed Field Experiment

Presented by: Robert Stüber (WZB Berlin)

AUG 12

11:45 AM - 12:00 PM

Estimating Preferences for Competition from Convex Budget Sets

Presented by: Lina Lozano (Maastricht University)

Co-author(s): Ernesto Reuben (NYU Abu Dhabi)

AUG 12

12:00 PM - 12:15 PM

Corrections and Collaborations in Group Work

Presented by: Yuki Takahashi (University of Bologna)

AUG 12

12:15 PM - 12:30 PM

The Good Wife? Reputation Dynamics Within the Household and Women's Access to Resources

Presented by: Nina Buchmann (Stanford University)

Co-author(s): Pascaline Dupas (Stanford University) and Roberta Ziparo (Aix-Marseille School of Economics)

AUG 12

12:30 PM - 1:00 PM

Break - Discussion

Friday, August 13, 2021

AUG 13

9:00 AM - 9:30 AM

Eliciting Moral Preferences: Theory and Experiment

Download Paper

Presented by: Roland Benabou (Princeton University)

Co-author(s): Armin Falk (University of Bonn), Henkel Luca (University of Bonn), and Jean Tirole (University of Toulouse)

We examine to what extent a personís moral preferences can be inferred from observing their choices, for instance via experiments, and in particular, how one should interpret certain behaviors that appear deontologically motivated. Comparing the performance of the direct elicitation (DE) and multiple-price list (MPL) mechanisms, we characterize in each case how (social or self) image motives ináate the extent to which agents behave prosocially. More surprisingly, this signaling bias is shown to depend on the elicitation method, both per se and interacted with the level of visibility: it is greater under DE for low reputation concerns, and greater under MPL when they become high enough. We then test the modelís predictions in an experiment in which nearly 700 subjects choose between money for themselves and implementing a 350e donation that will, in expectation, save one human life. Interacting the elicitation method with the decisionís level of visibility and salience, we Önd the key crossing e§ect predicted by the model. We also show theoretically that certain ìKantianî postures, turning down all prices in the o§ered range, easily emerge under MPL when reputation becomes important enough.

AUG 13

9:30 AM - 10:00 AM

Social Identity and Belief Polarization

Presented by: Yan Chen (University of Michigan)

Co-author(s): Kevin Bauer (Goethe University Frankfurt), Florian Hett (Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz), and Michael Kosfeld (Goethe University Frankfurt)

AUG 13

10:00 AM - 10:30 AM

Learning and Initial Play in the Prisoner's Dilemma

Presented by: Drew Fudenberg (MIT)

Co-author(s): Gustav Karreskog (Stockholm School of Economics)

AUG 13

10:30 AM - 11:00 AM

Break

AUG 13

11:00 AM - 11:30 AM

A Robust Test of Prejudice for Discrimination Experiments

Presented by: Daniel Martin (Northwestern University Kellogg School of Management)

Co-author(s): Philip Marx (Louisiana State University)

AUG 13

11:30 AM - 11:45 AM

Customer Discrimination and Quality Signals: A Field Experiment with Healthcare

Presented by: Alex Chan (Stanford University)

AUG 13

11:45 AM - 12:00 PM

Inference from Rareness and Valence of Events

Presented by: David Klinowski Gomez (Stanford University)

Co-author(s): Muriel Niederle (Stanford University) and Collin Raymond (Purdue University)

AUG 13

12:00 PM - 12:15 PM

Near-Miss Deterrence: Incorporating Near-Miss Effects into Deterrence Theory

Presented by: Stephanie Permut (Carnegie Mellon University)

Co-author(s): Silvia Saccardo (Carnegie Mellon University), Julie Downs (Carnegie Mellon University), and George Loewenstein (Carnegie Mellon University)

AUG 13

12:15 PM - 12:30 PM

Inducing Positive Sorting Through Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from Pakistani Schools

Presented by: Christina Brown (University of Chicago)

Co-author(s): Tahir Andrabi (Pomona College)

AUG 13Break - Discussion