Economics envy: signalling proposals for the radiation oncology match (to reduce congestion and coordination failure)

 Here's a call to introduce signaling into the resident match for radiation oncologists, explicitly modeled after the signaling used in the job market for economists.

I Need a Sign: The Growing Need for a Signaling Mechanism to Improve the Residency Match

Wesley J. Talcott, MD, MBA , Suzanne B. Evans, MD, MPH, 

Int J Radiation Oncol Biol Phys, Vol. 109, No. 2, pp. 329-331, FEBRUARY 01, 2021, DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijrobp.2020.09.008

"Increased attention has been directed toward the radiation oncology interview application process, as the COVID19 crisis threatens to exacerbate its many longstanding inefficiencies.1,  2,  3 A signaling mechanism, by which applicants can send a signal indicating strong interest to a strictly limited number of programs, has been discussed in other specialties to remedy similar inefficiencies4,  5,  6 and will be implemented this application cycle by otolaryngology residency programs. We strongly believe our field should similarly take a leading role on this initiative this application cycle.

Such a system is not novel. A signaling mechanism was introduced in the Economics postdoctoral job market match, which has resembled the Radiation Oncology market in terms of applications submitted per applicant and interview invitations per application. Candidates submitting applications have the option to signal to employers with up to 2 “signals of interest.” These signals are sent through a secure portal associated with the American Economic Association,7 rather than through an extrinsic third party. The instructions for the portal encourage applicants not to send signals to their top 2 programs, but instead to programs who would be likely to factor the signal into their interview invitation decision. 

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"To improve the interview application process, we recommend granting applicants a strictly limited supply of free virtual “signals of interest” that can be submitted via a monitored online portal. An applicant would be allowed to submit up to 2 signals from this portal to programs of interest. Signals must be limited, as value of these virtual signals comes from their scarcity; strict enforcement of a 2-signal limit means received signals convey credible interest, whereas the absence of an accompanying signal (the case with the vast majority of submitted applications) conveys essentially no information. This system should be free for applicants, to not introduce more financial inequities in this process. The cost to set up the online portal would be minimal given its simplicity, with little overhead once established, and could be shouldered by programs or radiation oncology organizations."