Auctions of poker and slot machine licenses in Victoria, by Plott, Cason, Gillen, Lee and Maron

The Design, Experimental Laboratory Testing and Implementation of a Large, Multi-Market, Policy Constrained, State Gaming Machines Auction
Charles R. Plott, California Institute of Technology
Timothy Cason, Purdue University
Benjamin Gillen, Claremont McKenna College
Hsingyang Lee, California Institute of Technology
Travis Maron, California Institute of Technology
(September 2019)

Abstract: The paper reports on the theory, design, laboratory experimental testing, field implementation and results of a large, multiple market and policy constrained auction. The auction involved the sale of 18,788 ten-year entitlements for the use of electronic gaming machines in 176 interconnected markets to 363 potential buyers representing licensed gaming establishments. The auction was conducted in one day and produced over $600M in revenue. The experiments and revealed dynamics of the multi-round auction provide evidence about basic principles of multiple market convergence found in classical theories of general equilibrium using new statistical tests of the abstract properties of tatonnement.