“Slava Bronfman, Avinatan Hassidim, Gideon Kalif, and Assaf Romm (2017), Matching practices for entry-labor markets – The Israeli Medical Internship Match, MiP Country Profile 25.”
Summary box
What is allocated? | Medical internships. |
Who are the participants? | Graduates of medical schools. |
Stated objectives of matching policy | Fairness among doctors, equal spread of talent across the country. |
Who’s in charge? | The Ministry of Health and a committee elected by the student body. |
In place since | 2014 |
Available capacity | Same as the number of doctors (≈500 local grads + ~200 foreign grads). |
Timing of enrolment | May of every year. |
Information available to applicants prior to enrolment period | Description and code of the mechanism, summary statistics of previous years. |
Restrictions on preference expression | Students must rank all hospitals. |
Matching procedure | Variant of competitive equilibrium with equal incomes (CEEI). |
Priorities and quotas | Proportional to hospitals’ size, and extra for periphery. |
Further special feature | Couples are to the same hospital. |
Bronfman, S., Hassidim, A., Afek, A., Romm, A., Shreberk, R., Hassidim, A. and Massler, A., 2015. Assigning Israeli medical graduates to internships. Israel journal of health policy research, 4(1).
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