NBER Market Design meeting at Stanford: Oct 28-9

Market Design Working Group Meeting

Michael Ostrovsky and Parag Pathak, Organizers

October 28-29, 2016

SIEPR Koret-Taube Conference Center Stanford University 366 Galvez Street Stanford, CA

Program

Participant List

 

Friday, October 28
8:30 am	Continental Breakfast
9:00 am	Darrell Duffie, Stanford University and NBER Haoxiang Zhu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Size Discovery
	Ahmad Peivandi, Georgia State University Participation and Unbiased Pricing in CDS Settlement Mechanisms
10:30 am	Break
11:00 am	Laura Doval, Yale University A Theory of Stability in Dynamic Matching Markets
	Hugo Hopenhayn, University of California at Los Angeles and NBER Maryam Saeedi, Carnegie Mellon University Bidding Dynamics in Auctions
12:30 pm	Lunch
2:00 pm	Christina Aperjis, Power Auctions LLC Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland Oleg Baranov, University of Colorado Boulder Thayer Morrill, North Carolina State University Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns
	Tibor Heumann, Princeton University Ascending Auctions with Multidimensional Signals
3:30 pm	Break
4:00 pm	John Hatfield, University of Texas at Austin Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University Hidden Substitutes
	Paul Milgrom, Stanford University Deferred Acceptance Auctions Without Substitutes
5:30 pm	Adjourn
6:30 pm	Dinner Il Fornaio Restaurant 520 Cowper Street Palo Alto, CA
Saturday, October 29
8:30 am	Continental Breakfast
9:00 am	Gabriel Carroll, Stanford University Ilya Segal, Stanford University Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities
	Songzi Du, Simon Fraser University Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
10:30 am	Break
11:00 am	Shengwu Li, Stanford University Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
	Marek Pycia, University of California at Los Angeles Peter Troyan, University of Virginia Obvious Dominance and Random Priority
12:30 pm	Lunch
2:00 pm	Benjamin Roth, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Ran Shorrer, Pennsylvania State University Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon-Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design
	Michal Feldman, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Nicole Immorlica, Northwestern University Brendan Lucier, Microsoft Research Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University Vasilis Syrgkanis, Microsoft Research Efficiency Guarantees in Large Markets
3:30 pm	Break
4:00 pm	David Delacretaz, University of Melbourne Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University Alexander Teytelboym, University of Oxford Refugee Resettlement
	Tommy Andersson, Lund University Lars Ehlers, Université de Montréal Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings
5:30 pm	Adjourn