Market design plays a role in the arguments both pro and con, in the recent symposium in the Journal of Economic Perspectives:
Moffitt mentions auction design, kidney exchange and school choice (with a more general reference to deferred acceptance clearinghouses) as beneficiaries of NSF funding. Cowen and Tabarrok single out auction design as something whose private benefits might argue against government funding: "Indeed, few areas in economics have been as privately remunerative as auction theory."
Symposium:
NSF Funding for Economists
|
In
Defense of the NSF Economics Program (#11)
Robert A. Moffitt |
Full-Text Access (Complimentary) | Supplementary Materials
|
A
Skeptical View of the National Science Foundation's Role in Economic Research (#12)
Tyler Cowen and Alex Tabarrok |
Full-Text Access (Complimentary) | Supplementary Materials
|
Moffitt mentions auction design, kidney exchange and school choice (with a more general reference to deferred acceptance clearinghouses) as beneficiaries of NSF funding. Cowen and Tabarrok single out auction design as something whose private benefits might argue against government funding: "Indeed, few areas in economics have been as privately remunerative as auction theory."
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