Two of the pioneers of market design for school choice, Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Parag Pathak, have teamed up with colleagues to analyse the effects of charter schools, using data from the school choice programs they helped design in Boston and New Orleans.
CHARTERS WITHOUT LOTTERIES: TESTING TAKEOVERS IN NEW ORLEANS AND BOSTON
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Joshua D. Angrist, Peter D. Hull, and Parag A. Pathak
Working Paper 20792
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20792
ABSTRACT
Lottery estimates suggest oversubscribed urban charter schools boost student achievement markedly. But these estimates needn’t capture treatment effects for students who haven’t applied to charter schools or for students attending charters for which demand is weak. This paper reports estimates of the effect of charter school attendance on middle-schoolers in charter takeovers in New Orleans and Boston. Takeovers are traditional public schools that close and then re-open as charter schools. Students enrolled in the schools designated for closure are eligible for “grandfathering” into the new schools; that is, they are guaranteed seats. We use this fact to construct instrumental variables estimates of the effects of passive charter attendance: the grandfathering instrument compares students at schools designated for takeover with students who appear similar at baseline and who were attending similar schools not yet closed, while adjusting for possible violations of the exclusion restriction in such comparisons. Estimates for a large sample of takeover schools in the New Orleans Recovery School District show substantial gains from takeover enrollment. In Boston, where we can compare grandfathering and lottery estimates for a middle school, grandfathered students see achievement gains at least as large as the gains for students assigned seats in lotteries. Larger reading gains for grandfathering compliers are explained by a worse non-charter fallback.
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School choice in New Orleans is one of the design projects undertaken by the Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice (IIPSC).
The design of Boston's school choice system predated IIPSC; here's an early paper on that: The Boston Public School Match.
CHARTERS WITHOUT LOTTERIES: TESTING TAKEOVERS IN NEW ORLEANS AND BOSTON
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Joshua D. Angrist, Peter D. Hull, and Parag A. Pathak
Working Paper 20792
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20792
ABSTRACT
Lottery estimates suggest oversubscribed urban charter schools boost student achievement markedly. But these estimates needn’t capture treatment effects for students who haven’t applied to charter schools or for students attending charters for which demand is weak. This paper reports estimates of the effect of charter school attendance on middle-schoolers in charter takeovers in New Orleans and Boston. Takeovers are traditional public schools that close and then re-open as charter schools. Students enrolled in the schools designated for closure are eligible for “grandfathering” into the new schools; that is, they are guaranteed seats. We use this fact to construct instrumental variables estimates of the effects of passive charter attendance: the grandfathering instrument compares students at schools designated for takeover with students who appear similar at baseline and who were attending similar schools not yet closed, while adjusting for possible violations of the exclusion restriction in such comparisons. Estimates for a large sample of takeover schools in the New Orleans Recovery School District show substantial gains from takeover enrollment. In Boston, where we can compare grandfathering and lottery estimates for a middle school, grandfathered students see achievement gains at least as large as the gains for students assigned seats in lotteries. Larger reading gains for grandfathering compliers are explained by a worse non-charter fallback.
*************
School choice in New Orleans is one of the design projects undertaken by the Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice (IIPSC).
The design of Boston's school choice system predated IIPSC; here's an early paper on that: The Boston Public School Match.
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