Here's the preliminary program...
Colloque CIREQ Montréal sur l’appariement
Programme préliminaire
VENDREDI, le 21 mars 2014
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9:00 – 10:30
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SESSION I – Président : Umut DUR (North Carolina State University)
Peter Coles (ebay Research Labs), Yannai Gonczarowski (Hebrew University),Ran SHORRER (Harvard University) Strategic Behavior in Unbalanced Matching Markets
Timo MENNLE (University of Zurich), Sven Seuken (University of Zurich)
An Axiomatic Approach to Characterizing and Relaxing Strategyproofness of One-sided Matching Mechanisms
Umut DUR (North Carolina State University), Onur Kesten (Carnegie Mellon University)
Sequential versus Simultaneous Assignment Problems and Two Applications |
10:30 – 11:00
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Pause
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11:00 – 12:30
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SESSION II - Président : Utku UNVER (Boston College)
Lars Ehlers (Université de Montréal, CIREQ), Alexander WESTKAMP (Maastricht University) Strategy-Proof Tie-Breaking
David Cantala (El Colegio de México), Szilvia PAPAI (Concordia University, CIREQ)
Reasonably and Securely Stable Matching
Marek Pycia (UCLA), Utku UNVER (Boston College)
Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Indivisible Resources |
12:30 – 14:00
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Lunch
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14:00 – 16:00
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SESSION III - Présidente : Bettina KLAUS (University of Lausanne)
Shuhei Morimoto (Kobe University), Shigehiro SERIZAWA (Osaka University) Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Non-quasi-linear Preferences : A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule
Jens GUDMUNDSSON, Helga Habis (Lund University)
Assignment Games with Externalities
Tomoya KAZUMURA, Shigehiro Serizawa (Osaka University)
An Impossibility of Allocating Objects among Agents with Non-Quasi-Linear Preferences
Bettina KLAUS (University of Lausanne), Jonathan Newton (University of Sydney)
Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems |
16:00 – 16:30
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Pause
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16:30 – 17:45
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KEYNOTE LECTURE : Tayfun SÖNMEZ (Boston College)
Kidney Exchange : Past, Present, and Potential Future |
19:00
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Dîner de conférence (sur invitation seulement)Restaurant Laloux, 250, Pine Avenue East
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SAMEDI, le 22 mars 2014
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9:00 – 10:30
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SESSION IV – Président : Jan Christoph SCHLEGEL (Université de Lausanne)
Madhav RAGHAVAN (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi) Fair Assignment with Capacity Constraints
Takashi AKAHOSHI (Waseda University)
Singleton Core in Many-to-One Matching Problems
Jan Christoph SCHLEGEL (Université de Lausanne)
Contracts versus Salaries in Matching : A General Result |
10:30 – 11:00
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Pause
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11:00 – 12:30
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SESSION V – Président : Panos TOULIS (Harvard University)
M. Bumin Yenmez (Carnegie Mellon University), Federico ECHENIQUE (California Institute of Technology) How to Control Controlled School Choice
Péter Biró (Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Elena IÑARRA (University of the Basque Country), Elena Molis (University of Granada)
Solutions Concepts for Unsolvable Roommate Problems
David C. Parkes (SEAS, Harvard University), Panos TOULIS (Harvard University)
A Random Graph Model of Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchanges |
12:30 – 14:00
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Lunch
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14:00 – 16:00
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SESSION VI – Président : Vikram MANJUNATH (Université de Montréal, CIREQ)
* Chaque présentation de cette session sera de 20 minutes. Ville KORPELA (Turku School of Economics) Nash Implementation of Stable Solutions in Many-to-One Matching Problems : The Case with No Complementarities
Samson ALVA (University of Texas at San Antonio)
Pairwise Stability and Complementarity in Many-to-One Matching
Mustafa Oğuz Afacan (Sabanci University), Bertan TURHAN (Boston College)
Assignment Maximization
Lars EHLERS (Université de Montréal, CIREQ)
TBA
Alexander TEYTELBOYM (MIT)
Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Networks with Bilateral Contracts
Vikram MANJUNATH (Université de Montréal, CIREQ), Bertan Turhan (Boston College)
When Two Should Be One but Aren’t : Milwaukee Public Schools and the Voucher System |
16:00 – 16:30
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Pause
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16:30 – 18:00
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SESSION VII – Président : Nizar ALLOUCH (Queen Mary University of London)
Claudia HERRESTHAL (Oxford University) Mobility, Learning and School Choice
Albin Erlanson (Lund University), Karol SZWAGRZAK (University of Southern Denmark)
Strategy-proof Package Assignment
Nizar ALLOUCH (Queen Mary University of London)
The Cost of Segregation in Social Networks |
18:00
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Réception de clôtureColloque CIREQ Montréal sur l’appariement
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