Workshop on “Advances in Mechanism Design”, June 11–12, 2013
Paris School of Economics, “Grande Salle”, 48 Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France
Here's the program:
Tuesday, June 11
09:00 - 10:00: Fuhito Kojima (Stanford):
“Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications”
10:00 - 11:00: Dorothea Kubler (WZB Berlin):
“Implementing Quotas in University Admissions: Experimental Evidence”
Coffee Break
11:30 - 12:30: Yinghua He (TSE):
“Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Two-Sided Matching”
Lunch
14:00 - 15:00: Alfred Galichon (Sciences Po):
“The Roomate Problem Is More Stable Than You Think”
15:00 - 16:00: Estelle Cantillon (ULB):
“Endogenous Preferences and the Role of the Mechanism in School Choice”
Coffee Break
16:30 - 17:30: Eduardo Azevedo (U Penn):
“A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets”
Wednesday, June 12
09:00 - 10:00: Jinwoo Kim (Seoul National U):
“Stable Matching in Large Economies”
10:00 - 11:00: Francis Bloch (Polytechnique):
“Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents”
Coffee Break
11:30 - 12:30: Sonia Jaffe (Harvard):
“Taxation in Matching Markets”
Lunch
14:00 - 15:00: Tadashi Hashimoto (Stanford):
“The Generalized Random Priority Mechanism with Budgets”
15:00 - 16:00: Clayton Featherstone (U Penn):
“A Rank-based Refinement of Ordinal Efficiency and a New (but familiar) Class of Ordinal
Assignment Mechanisms”
Coffee Break
16:30 - 17:30: Muriel Niederle (Stanford):
“Propose with a Rose? Signaling in Internet Dating Markets”
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