NBER market design conference Oct 19-20, 2012: preliminary program

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INC.

Market Design Working Group Meeting

Susan Athey and Parag Pathak, Organizers

October 19-20, 2012

NBER
2^nd Floor Conference Room1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA
PROGRAM

Friday, October 19:
8:30 am	Continental Breakfast
9:00 am	Mechanism Design and Congestion William Fuchs, University of California at Berkeley Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stanford University Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market
	Jacob Leshno, Columbia University Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Systems
10:20 am	Break
10:35 am	Auctions Kenneth Hendricks, University of Wisconsin and NBER Daniel Quint, University of Wisconsin Indicative Bids as Cheap Talk Sergiu Hart, Hebrew University Noam Nisan, Hebrew University The Menu-Size Complexity of Auctions
	Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University Jinwoo Kim, Yonsei University Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University Efficient Assignment with Interdependent Values
12:35 pm	Lunch
1:15 pm	Organ Exchange
	Itai Ashlagi, MIT Alvin Roth, Stanford University and NBER Kidney Exchange in Time and Space
	Tayfun Sonmez, Boston College M. Utku Unver, Boston College Welfare Consequences of Transplant Organ Allocation Policies
2:40 pm	Break
3:00 pm	FCC Incentive AuctionLawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland Paul Milgrom, Stanford University Ilya Segal, Stanford UniversityThe 'Incentive Auctions' and Mechanism Design Peter Cramton, University of Maryland Title to be announced
5:15 pm	Adjourn Saturday, October 20: 8:30 am Continental Breakfast 9:00 am Empirical Market Design Aditya Bhave, University of Chicago Eric Budish, University of Chicago Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of "Bob the Broker" Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Duke University Nikhil Agarwal, Harvard University Parag Pathak, MIT and NBER Centralized vs. Decentralized School Assignment: Evidence from NY 10:20 am Break 10:40 am Matching Markets Qingmin Liu, Columbia University Marek Pycia, University of California at Los Angeles Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness and Incentives in Large Markets Scott Duke Kominers, University of Chicago Tayfun Sonmez, Boston College Designing for Diversity in Matching 12:00 pm Lunch 1:00 pm New Frontiers Elisa Celis, University of Washington Gregory Lewis, Harvard University and NBER Markus Mobius, Iowa State University and NBER Hamid Nazerzadeh, University of Southern California Buy-it-Now or Take-a-Chance: Price Discrimination through Randomized Auctions Michael Kearns, University of Pennsylvania Mallesh Pai, University of Pennsylvania Aaron Roth, University of Pennsylvania Jonathan Ullman, Harvard University Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy David Rothschild, Microsoft Research David Pennock, Microsoft Research The Extent of Price Misalignment in Prediction Markets 3:00 pm Adjourn