Scott Kominers at Chicago (now): Topics in Matching and Market Design
Eric Budish at Chicago Booth (in the Spring): Market Design
Paul Milgrom at Stanford (now): Theory and Practice of Auction Market Design
Mike Ostrovsky at Stanford GSB isn't teaching his topics in market design course this year, but writes: "I will teach the basic first-year course, which covers many standard market design topics (auctions, matching, etc.). There is no linkable webpage yet (the class begins in the Spring quarter, in April), but the description is available on this page:
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/research/courses/phdecon.html.
The course is MGTECON 602; here is the description, copied from past years:
"This course covers auction theory, matching, and related parts of the
literature on bargaining and pricing. Key papers in the early part of the
course are Myerson and Satterthwaite on bargaining, Myerson on optimal
auctions, and Milgrom and Weber's classic work. We then turn to markets in
which complicated preferences and constraints, limitations on the use of cash,
or variations in contract details among bidders play an important role. Emphasis
is on matching markets such as the National Resident Matching Program and asset
auctions such as the spectrum auctions."
Parag Pathak at MIT writes (from Ankgor Wat) that "I have a course but the web page isn't up yet - its an undergrad course called market design 14.19 at MIT. I'll send over the specifics when it is up (we still don't start for a couple weeks)"
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.