Showing posts sorted by relevance for query "San Francisco" AND school. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query "San Francisco" AND school. Sort by date Show all posts

Friday, July 14, 2023

Harm reduction is not a panacea: drug use and drug policy in Portugal, and San Francisco

 The Washington Post has a story about Portugal, and the SF Chronicle has one as well. Both stories touch on the tensions between treating drug addicts with respect, and assuring that cities remain safe and livable.  

Here's the Washington Post:

Once hailed for decriminalizing drugs, Portugal is now having doubts  By Anthony Faiola and Catarina Fernandes Martins

"Portugal decriminalized all drug use, including marijuana, cocaine and heroin, in an experiment that inspired similar efforts elsewhere, but now police are blaming a spike in the number of people who use drugs for a rise in crime. In one neighborhood, state-issued paraphernalia — powder-blue syringe caps, packets of citric acid for diluting heroin — litters sidewalks outside an elementary school.

"Porto’s police have increased patrols to drug-plagued neighborhoods. But given existing laws, there’s only so much they can do. 

...

"Portugal became a model for progressive jurisdictions around the world embracing drug decriminalization, such as the state of Oregon, but now there is talk of fatigue. Police are less motivated to register people who misuse drugs and there are year-long waits for state-funded rehabilitation treatment even as the number of people seeking help has fallen dramatically. The return in force of visible urban drug use, meanwhile, is leading the mayor and others here to ask an explosive question: Is it time to reconsider this country’s globally hailed drug model?

“These days in Portugal, it is forbidden to smoke tobacco outside a school or a hospital. It is forbidden to advertise ice cream and sugar candies. And yet, it is allowed for [people] to be there, injecting drugs,” said Rui Moreira, Porto’s mayor. “We’ve normalized it.”

...

" In the United States alone, overdose deaths, fueled by opioids and deadly synthetic fentanyl, topped 100,000 in both 2021 and 2022 — or double what it was in 2015. According to the National Institutes of Health, 85 percent of the U.S. prison population has an active substance use disorder or was jailed for a crime involving drugs or drug use.

"Across the Atlantic in Europe, tiny Portugal appeared to harbor an answer. In 2001, it threw out years of punishment-driven policies in favor of harm reduction by decriminalizing consumption of all drugs for personal use, including the purchase and possession of 10-day supplies. Consumption remains technically against the law, but instead of jail, people who misuse drugs are registered by police and referred to “dissuasion commissions.” 

...Other countries have moved to channel drug offenses out of the penal system too. But none in Europe institutionalized that route more than Portugal. Within a few years, HIV transmission rates via syringes — one the biggest arguments for decriminalization — had plummeted. From 2000 to 2008, prison populations fell by 16.5 percent. Overdose rates dropped as public funds flowed from jails to rehabilitation. There was no evidence of a feared surge in use.

...

"But in the first substantial way since decriminalization passed, some Portuguese voices are now calling for a rethink of a policy that was long a proud point of national consensus. Urban visibility of the drug problem, police say, is at its worst point in decades

...

"A newly released national survey suggests the percent of adults who have used illicit drugs increased to 12.8 percent in 2022, up from 7.8 in 2001, though still below European averages.

...

"Porto’s mayor and other critics, including neighborhood activist groups, are not calling for a wholesale repeal of decriminalization — but rather, a limited re-criminalization in urban areas and near schools and hospitals to address rising numbers of people misusing drugs."

...

"After years of economic crisis, Portugal decentralized its drug oversight operation in 2012. A funding drop from 76 million euros ($82.7 million) to 16 million euros ($17.4 million) forced Portugal’s main institution to outsource work previously done by the state to nonprofit groups,

...

"Twenty years ago, “we were quite successful in dealing with the big problem, the epidemic of heroin use and all the related effects,” Goulão said in an interview with The Washington Post. “But we have had a kind of disinvestment, a freezing in our response … and we lost some efficacy.”

*******

And here are some related paragraphs about San Francisco, in a story in the San Francisco Chronicle about a concentration of drug dealers from Honduras:

THIS IS THE HOMETOWN OF SAN FRANCISCO’S DRUG DEALERS By Megan Cassidy and Gabrielle Lurie |  July 10, 2023

"Like many other U.S. cities, San Francisco shifted years ago to treating drug use more like a disease than a crime. The heavy policing approach of the War on Drugs era failed to slow dealers or decrease demand while overcrowding jails and disproportionately punishing people of color, studies show.

"Now one of the most progressive cities in the nation is fracturing over concerns that it has become too permissive. What to do about the Honduran dealers is a key political issue as a major citywide election approaches in 2024.

"On a weekday afternoon in June, a man in his early 30s lay motionless on a SoMa sidewalk outside the Federal Building. On his right, a dozen users smoked fentanyl and crack cocaine or hung bent at the waist, heads suspended at their knees. To his left, a handful of dealers, cloaked in black but for the space around their eyes, continued selling while a passerby revived the man with Narcan, the nasal-spray antidote to opioid overdoses, and as paramedics arrived to treat him a few minutes later.

“I’m so mad at them for ruining my neighborhood,” said Kevin DeMattia, who owns Emperor Norton’s bar and has lived in the Tenderloin for the past 25 years. “Businesses are dying because people don’t want to come to the Tenderloin.  They’re ruining the neighborhood in so many ways. They’re poisoning people. … They’re this cancer, this aggressive, metastasizing cancer on the Tenderloin — the dealers and the addicts.”


Wednesday, November 10, 2010

School choice in San Francisco: a promise of transparency

San Francisco school board member Rachel Norton blogs about the most recent school board meeting this week, concerning the new SF school choice algorithm, which they are now implementing in house (see this earlier post, and a followup interview).

The latest news sounds good regarding plans for transparency. Norton writes:

"Staff did pledge to make the documentation of the algorithm requirements and process flows public by February; I will continue to push to make the assignment algorithm itself open source."

Saturday, June 4, 2011

Further followup on school choice in San Francisco

My Thursday post, Followup on school choice in San Francisco, has generated some followup on its own, in the form of an audio interview yesterday of School Board member Rachel Norton by Stan Goldberg who follows the SF school system under the name Senior Dad.  He summarizes the interview as "Straight answers from Commissioner Norton “because people have a right to know”."

The issue is whether the algorithm adopted by the board last year was in fact implemented correctly by the district staff. It's an important question because the correctly implemented algorithm would be strategy proof, and if parents had confidence in this it would vastly simplify the school choice system from parents' point of view.

Here is my very incomplete and possibly imperfect transcript to give the flavor of the last 5 minutes of the interview (starting just after minute 39) in which Stan Goldberg (SG) raises this issue, and Rachel Norton (RN) replies. It's worth listening to.

SG “The school district was supposed to release the algorithm they were assigning students on, and so far they have not released that algorithm.”

RN “you’ve been reading Al Roth’s blog” ...“I’ve advocated for that, and will continue to advocate for that. I don’t think the staff right now wants to do that. [laughter] But short of 5 votes, 4 votes, they don’t have to.
SG ‘why should the public trust the school district?  “I’ve had the deputy Superintendent say ‘you guys shouldn’t trust us, we haven’t been reliable’. He said that; I believed him.”

RN “I don’t know what to tell you Sam, I think we should release the algorithm, and I’ve said that to staff, I’ve said that to the Superintendent”…short of 3 other board members joining with me and demanding that it be released the superintendent can do what he thinks is best,  unless he’s ordered by the board to do something else…”

SG “not releasing the algorithm makes everybody think something funny is going on…”
RN” well, not everyone…”

Sunday, March 25, 2012

School choice in San Francisco, reports on first year

I've written before about school choice in San Francisco, and about how Muriel Niederle and Clayton Featherstone led the effort by a group of our colleagues to design a strategy-proof choice algorithm (explained here at a Board meeting in 2010), based on transfer cycles ("top trading cycles" to game theorists...). The school board adopted the plan, but then the staff of the school district decided to implement it themselves, without making the details public. Fast forward to 2012, when the first children have been assigned by the new plan.

Rachel Norton's blog has a post about it here: They're out! School Assignment Letter 2012, and an earlier one here, with a link to a March 5, 2012 SFUSD report on Student Assignment. As in the previous SFUSD reports, this does not describe the choice algorithm, it only describes the "tie breakers" that are used whenever the algorithm would otherwise try to assign more students to a school than it has room for.

This outraged Stan Goldberg (who reports about SF schools as "Senior Dad"), and he posted a video about the lack of transparency called Assignment System Fraud?

He must be an influential guy, because this prompted SFUSD to post some new information, including this "fact sheet" dated March 23, called How does the student assignment computer program work?  It still doesn't come close to explaining the actual algorithm they use, but it does include a diagram of "transfer cycles."

Which raises a question. If they in fact implemented the plan we proposed and the Board adopted, you would think they would want to make this clear. The benefits of a strategy-proof assignment procedure can only be realized if parents know that they can safely list their true preferences.

On the other hand, if the algorithm isn't correctly implemented, or if some other assignment algorithm is implemented (whether or not it includes some use of transfer cycles) then it would most likely not be strategy-proof, that is, it might not be safe for parents to reveal their true preferences, and it might be in the interest of some to "game the system" in some way. That might account for a desire to keep the algorithm secret. (So might a desire to avoid revealing any inadvertent mistakes in implementation...)

I should say that SFUSD's brief description of their algorithm doesn't look to me like it describes one that is strategy-proof...:(On the contrary, it looks like it might be patched together from something like Boston's old immediate acceptance algorithm followed by some trading...but then again, it isn't a complete enough description to make me confident that it is a description of whatever they are in fact doing...)

Anyway, one point of this post is to say that, unlike the case of the systems in New York and Boston and the work that IIPSC is doing around the country, my colleagues and I don't know what algorithm SFUSD is using, even though we know what we proposed and the Board adopted. So...this post is a bit like the ads that sometimes appeared in the financial sections of newspapers when I was young, which, following a divorce, would announce that Mr John Doe was henceforth no longer responsible for any debts incurred by the former Mrs John Doe...

Friday, January 3, 2020

ASSA meetings in San Diego--Market design on Friday

The ASSA meetings are a cornucopia.  Here are some sessions related to market design that caught my eye in the preliminary program for the first day of conferencing, Friday January 3. No one can go to all of them, aside from interviewing junior market candidates, some of these sessions conflict with each other...:-(

Frontiers in Market Design
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   8:00 AM - 10:00 AM
 Marriott Marquis San Diego, Catalina
Hosted By: ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY
Chair: Eric Budish, University of Chicago
Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation
Daniel Waldinger, New York University

Approximating the Equilibrium Effects of Informed School Choice
Claudia Allende, Columbia University and Princeton University
Francisco Gallego, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile
Christopher Neilson, Princeton University

The Efficiency of A Dynamic Decentralized Two-Sided Matching Market
Tracy Liu, Tsinghua University
Zhixi Wan, Didi Chuxing
Chenyu Yang, University of Rochester

Will the Market Fix the Market? A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation
Eric Budish, University of Chicago
Robin Lee, Harvard University
John Shim, University of Chicago

When Do Cardinal Mechanisms Outperform Ordinal Mechanisms?: Operationalizing Pseudomarkets
Hulya Eraslan, Rice University
Jeremy Fox, Rice University
Yinghua He, Rice University
Yakym Pirozhenko, Rice University
*********
Search and Matching in Education Markets
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (PST)
 Marriott Marquis San Diego, Rancho Santa Fe 2
Hosted By: AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
Chair: Eric Budish, University of Chicago

Simultaneous Search: Beyond Independent Successes
Ran Shorrer, Pennsylvania State University

Search Costs, Biased Beliefs and School Choice under Endogenous Consideration Sets
Christopher Neilson, Princeton University
Claudia Allende, Columbia University
Patrick Agte, Princeton University
Adam Kapor, Princeton University

Facilitating Student Information Acquisition in Matching Markets
Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research
Jacob Leshno, University of Chicago
Irene Lo, Stanford University
Brendan Lucier, Microsoft Research

Why Are Schools Segregated? Evidence from the Secondary-School Match in Amsterdam
Hessel Oosterbeek, University of Amsterdam
Sandor Sovago, University of Groningen
Bas van der Klaauw, VU University Amsterdam

***********
Market Design
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   10:15 AM - 12:15 PM
 Marriott Marquis San Diego, Del Mar
Hosted By: ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY
Chair: Sergei Severinov, University of British Columbia

Market Design and Walrasian Equilibrium
Faruk Gul, Princeton University
Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Princeton University
Mu Zhang, Princeton University

Repeat Applications in College Admissions
Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University
Jinwoo Kim, Seoul National University
Youngwoo Koh, Hanyang University

Entry-Proofness and Market Breakdown under Adverse Selection
Thomas Mariotti, Toulouse School of Economics

Who Wants to Be an Auctioneer?
Sergei Severinov, University of British Columbia
Gabor Virag, University of Toronto
**********
Transportation Economics
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (PST)
 Marriott Marquis San Diego, La Costa
Hosted By: ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY
Chair: Tobias Salz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Selection of Prices and Commissions in a Spatial Model of Ride-Hailing
Cemil Selcuk, Cardiff University

The Welfare Effect of Road Congestion Pricing: Experimental Evidence and Equilibrium Implications
Gabriel Kreindler, University of Chicago

Customer Preference and Station Network in the London Bike Share System
Elena Belavina, Cornell University
Karan Girotra, Cornell University
Pu He, Columbia University
Fanyin Zheng, Columbia University

Platform Design in Ride Hail: An Empirical Investigation
Nicholas Buchholz, Princeton University
Laura Doval, California Institute of Technology
Jakub Kastl, Princeton University
Filip Matejka, Charles University and Academy of Science
Tobias Salz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
**********

Information (Design), Black Markets, and Congestion
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   2:30 PM - 4:30 PM
 Manchester Grand Hyatt San Diego, Torrey Hills AB
Hosted By: ECONOMIC SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
Chair: Dorothea Kuebler, WZB Berlin Social Science Center
An Experimental Study of Matching Markets with Incomplete Information
Marina Agranov, California Institute of Technology
Ahrash Dianat, University of Essex
Larry Samuelson, Yale University
Leeat Yariv, Princeton University

Information Design in Dynamic Contests: An Experimental Study
Yan Chen, University of Michigan
Mohamed Mostagir, University of Michigan
Iman Yeckehzaare, University of Michigan

How to Avoid Black Markets for Appointments with Online Booking Systems
Rustamdjan Hakimov, University of Lausanne
C.-Philipp Heller, NERA Economic Consulting
Dorothea Kuebler, WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Morimitsu Kurino, Keio University

Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets
Yinghua He, Rice University
Thierry Magnac, Toulouse School of Economics

Discussant(s)
Christian Basteck, ECARES Brussels
Lionel Page, University of Technology Sydney
Robert Hammond, University of Alabama
Ahrash Dianat, University of Essex
*******

Tech Economics
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   2:30 PM - 4:30 PM
 Marriott Marquis San Diego, San Diego Ballroom A
Hosted By: NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR BUSINESS ECONOMICS
Chair: Michael Luca, Harvard Business School

GDPR and the Home Bias of Venture Investment
Jian Jia, Illinois Institute of Technology
Ginger Jin, University of Maryland
Liad Wagman, Illinois Institute of Technology

New Goods, Productivity and the Measurement of Inflation: Using Machine Learning to Improve Quality Adjustments
Victor Chernozhukov, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Patrick Bajari, Amazon

Double Randomized Online Experiments
Guido Imbens, Stanford University
Patrick Bajari, Amazon


Wednesday, August 4, 2010

School choice in Darebin City, Victoria, Australia

It sounds like at least one school district in Australia has less bureaucracy than my colleagues and I have encountered in helping American cities reorganize their school assignment systems. Kwanghui Lim at CoRE Economics reports: Game Theory in Action: Sven Feldmann on Kindergarten Matching.

More on school choice here, and here. (And here is a video of Muriel Niederle presenting a new school choice algorithm to the San Francisco school board meeting that gave the go ahead for a redesign there.)

Sunday, October 2, 2022

Return to previous school assignment policies (in some respects) under New York City's new mayor

 In NYC, the pendulum is still swinging between inclusive admissions as measured by demographics and determined by lottery, and meritocratic admissions as measured by tests and grades.

The NYT has the story:

In a Reversal, New York City Tightens Admissions to Some Top Schools. The city loosened selection criteria during the pandemic, policies some parents protested as unfair and others hoped would reduce racial disparities. By Troy Closson

"New York City’s selective middle schools can once again use grades to choose which students to admit, the school chancellor, David C. Banks, announced on Thursday, rolling back a pandemic-era moratorium that had opened the doors of some of the city’s most elite schools to more low-income students.

...

"New York City has used selective admissions for public schools more than any school district in the country. About a third of the city’s 900 or so middle and high schools had some kind of admissions requirement before the pandemic disrupted many measures to sort students by academic performance.

...

"Selective high schools will also be able to prioritize top-performing students.

"The sweeping move will end the random lottery for middle schools, a major shift after the previous administration ended the use of grades and test scores two years ago. At the city’s competitive high schools, where changes widened the pool of eligible applicants, priority for seats will be limited to top students whose grades are an A average.

...

"The announcement came as New York City’s education officials are confronting multiple crises in the wake of the pandemic, complicating a dilemma that has bedeviled previous administrations: how to create more equitable schools, while trying to prevent middle-class families from abandoning the system.

"State standardized test scores released Wednesday showed that many students fell behind, particularly in math, and that many Hispanic, Black and low-income students continue to lag far behind their white, Asian and higher-income peers. At the same time, the district is bleeding students: Roughly 120,000 families have left traditional public schools over the past five years. Some have left the system, and others have gone to charter schools."

*****

And here's the Washington Post:

New York City, embracing merit, rolls back diversity plan for schools By Laura Meckler

"New York City schools announced Thursday they would allow middle schools to consider academics in admitting students to some of the city’s most sought-after programs, unraveling pandemic-era rules aimed at injecting racial and economic diversity into a segregated system.

"High schools would also rely more heavily on merit and less on the luck of a lottery under the new plan, reversing the previous administration’s direction as a new mayor takes command of the nation’s largest school system.

...

"In San Francisco, admissions into the elite Lowell High School were converted from merit-based into a lottery system. As in New York, though, the change was reversed — in this case, after several school board members were recalled, in part over this issue.

"In Northern Virginia, Thomas Jefferson High School for Science and Technology also shifted from an admissions test to a “holistic review” that considers several factors, a move that is being challenged in court and has faced resistance from the Republican governor and his administration.

...

"In New York, the debate is particularly fiery because students are required to apply to middle and high school, and before the pandemic, about a third of the city’s 900 middle and high schools included requirements for admission — such as grades, test scores, attendance and behavior records. 

...

"That system was largely converted into a lottery under Mayor Bill de Blasio.

"For high school, applicants were put into tiers based on their grades. But the top tier included about 60 percent of all students, who had the first crack at the top schools. Competitive schools drew acceptances randomly from this group.

...

"Now, under the new system announced Thursday, it will be harder to get into the top tier, though once in that group, it will still be a lottery. To get into the top tier, students must be in the top 15 percent of their school or of the city overall, and they must have at least a 90 percent on grades.

"Test scores, which had been used for years but also criticized as biased, will not be considered. Banks said exam scores are a flawed measure but grades are “still a very solid indicator of how you are showing up as a student,” even for students who face hardships at home."

Monday, March 15, 2010

New school choice system in San Francisco

Board Approves New Student Assignment System for San Francisco Schools (now here)

Most of the last minute discussion was about what priorities different kinds of students will have at different kinds of schools. That is something that is likely to be adjusted from year to year. But the nice thing is that the underlying choice architecture will make it safe for parents to state their true preferences however the priorities are adjusted.

From the press release: "The choice algorithm was designed with the help of a volunteer team of market design experts who have previously been involved in designing choice algorithms for school choice in Boston and New York City. Volunteers from four prominent universities contributed to the effort, including Clayton Featherstone and Muriel Niederle of Stanford University, Atila Abdulkadiroglu of Duke University, Parag Pathak of MIT, and Alvin Roth of Harvard.
“We are pleased that the district has decided to adopt a choice architecture that makes it safe for parents to concentrate their effort on determining which schools they prefer, with confidence that they won’t hurt their chances by listing their preferences truthfully,” said Niederle and Featherstone, the Stanford research team."

Here are Rachel Norton's comments (she's a school board member with a blog), and here's the story from the SF Chronicle. Here are some of my recent posts on school choice; many of the recent ones tell the SF story as it unfolded.

Now, on to implementation.

Saturday, October 9, 2021

Peter Lorentzen interviews me about market design (podcast)

 Peter Lorentzen interviews me about market design, and my book Who Gets What and Why. (We have an interesting conversation on market design and my career, not closely related to the book...)

"In our interview, we range far beyond the examples from the book to discuss the implications of his work for the design of tech’s market-making “platform” businesses like Airbnb, Amazon, Lyft, or Uber, the challenges he faces when countries or people view some kinds of transactions as “repugnant” or morally unacceptable, and the reasons why San Francisco’s school district (unlike Boston’s or New York’s) chose not to implement the un-gameable school choice plan his team devised for them.

"Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics."

;


Sunday, November 9, 2014

Matching and Market Design at INFORMS in San Francisco, Sunday November 9

There's a lot of market design at the INFORMS annual meeting, Nov 9-12.

On Sunday I'll start the day off with a talk from  10-10:50 called
"Market Design and the Economist as Engineer."

That will be followed by a cluster of talks organized by Itai Ashlagi called (embarrassingly)
Matching and Market Design (in honor of Al Roth), consisting of the following sessions

Cluster : Matching and Market Design (in honor of Al Roth)

Session Information : Sunday Nov 09, 11:00 - 12:30

Title: Empirical Market Design
Chair: Ramesh Johari,Stanford University, 

Abstract Details

Title: Quality Externalities and the Limits of Reputation in Two-Sided Markets
Presenting Author: Steve Tadelis,Professor, UC Berkeley, Haas School of Business, 2220 Piedmont Ave, Berkeley, United States of America, stadelis@haas.berkeley.edu
Co-Author: Chris Nosko,Booth School of Business, University Of Chicago, Chicago, United States of America, cnosko@chicagobooth.edu
Abstract: Using data from eBay, we argue that platforms can mitigate externalities by actively screening sellers and promoting the prominence of better quality sellers. Exploiting the bias in feedback, we create a measure of seller quality and demonstrate the benefits of our approach through a controlled experiment that prioritizes better quality sellers to a random subset of buyers. .
Title: On the Near Impossibility of Measuring the Returns to Advertising
Presenting Author: Randall Lewis,Economic Research Scientist, Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View Ca 94043, United States of America, randall@econinformatics.com
Co-Author: Justin Rao,Economic Research Scientist, Microsoft Research, New York City NY, United States of America, Justin.Rao@microsoft.com
Abstract: Firms have a hard time measuring the causal impact of advertising expenditures on profit. In twenty-five online field experiments, individual-level sales are volatile relative to the per capita cost of a campaign--a small impact on a noisy dependent variable can generate positive returns. Experiments can need more than ten million person-weeks. Further, small selection biases can severely bias observational estimates. Weak informational feedback and technological advances shape ad marketplaces.
Title: Corporate Prediction Markets: Evidence from Google, Ford, and Firm X
Presenting Author: Bo Cowgill,UC Berkeley, 1931 Diamond St Apt 3, SAN FRANCISCO Ca 94131, United States of America, bo.cowgill@gmail.com
Co-Author: Eric Zitezwitz,Dartmouth College, 6106 Rockefeller Hall, Hanover NH, United States of America, zitzewitz@dartmouth.edu
Abstract: We examine data from prediction markets run by Google, Ford and Firm X (a large private materials company). Despite theoretically adverse conditions, we find these markets are relatively efficient, and improve upon the forecasts of experts at all three firms by as much as a 25% reduction in MSE. The most notable inefficiency is an optimism bias in the markets at Google and Ford. The inefficiencies that do exist become smaller over time for reasons we document.
Title: At What Quality and What Price? Inducing Separating Equilibria as a Market Design Problem
Presenting Author: John Horton,Professor, NYU Stern School of Business, Kaufman Management Center, 44 West Fourth St, 8-81, New York NY 10012, United States of America, john.joseph.horton@gmail.com
Co-Author: Ramesh Johari,Stanford University, Huang 311, Stanford, United States of America, ramesh.johari@stanford.edu
Abstract: A tool to promote revelation of buyers' price/quality preferences was experimentally introduced into an online labor market. In the treatment cells of the experiment, upon posting a job, buyers chose what price/quality level they were seeking from sellers. We find that buyers readily reveal their preferences and that this revelation---which itself was experimentally manipulated---strongly induced seller-side sorting.




Title: 

********


Matching and Market Design
Chair: Jacob Leshno,Columbia University, 

Abstract Details

Title: Matching in Networks
Presenting Author: Michael Ostrovsky,Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 655 Knight Way, Stanford CA 94305, United States of America, ostrovsky@stanford.edu
Abstract: In this talk, I will present results on the existence and properties of stable outcomes in trading networks.
Title: Matching with Peers in School Choice
Presenting Author: Atila Abdulkadiroglu,Professor, Duke University, 213 Social Sciences Building, Durham NC 27708, United States of America, atila.abdulkadiroglu@duke.edu
Abstract: We develop a theory for matching of students to schools with peers and study various matching mechanisms with field data.
Title: Endogenous preferences and the role of the mechanism in school choice
Presenting Author: Estelle Cantillon,Senior Research Fellow, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ECARES), 50, av FD Roosevelt, CP 114, Brussels 1050, Belgium, Estelle.Cantillon@ulb.ac.be
Abstract: We consider a school choice model where preferences over schools are endogenous because students care about the quality of their peers. In such a setting, the mechanism affects the degree of preference polarization. We show how mechanisms can be designed to reduce polarization and improve the distribution of ranks of assigned schools in students’ preferences. A policy change in the city of Ghent (Belgium) provides a test for the predictions of the theory.
Title: Evidence of Strategic Behavior in Hospital Claims Reporting
Presenting Author: Hamsa Bastani,Stanford University, Stanford, Stanford, United States of America, hsridhar@stanford.edu
Co-Author: Mohsen Bayati,Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford CA 94305, United States of America, bayati@gsb.stanford.edu
Joel Goh,joelgoh@stanford.edu
Stefanos Zenios,Charles A. Holloway Professor of Operations, Information, and Technology and Professor of Health Care Management, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 655 Knight Way, Stanford CA 94305, United States of America, stefzen@GSB.Stanford.Edu
Abstract: We provide evidence from Medicare claims data that hospitals engage in upcoding behavior when reporting hospital-acquired infections that are no longer reimbursed by Medicare. In particular, we show that hospitals sometimes mark a hospital-acquired infection as present-on-admission, presumably in order to collect greater reimbursement.
*******
Title: Matching Markets
Chair: Yash Kanoria,Columbia Business School, 
Abstract Details

Title: Stable Matching in Large Economies
Presenting Author: Fuhito Kojima,Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford CA 943055007, United States of America, fkojima@stanford.edu
Abstract: Complementarities of preferences have been known to jeopardize stability of two-sided matching markets, yet they are a pervasive feature in many matching markets. In large markets, we demonstrate that if each firm's choice changes continuously as the set of available workers changes, then there exists a stable matching even if firm preferences exhibit complementarity. Building on this result, we show that there exists an approximately stable matching in any large finite economy.
Title: The Prior-Independence Approach
Presenting Author: Inbal Talgam-Cohen,PhD Candidate, Stanford University, 86 Hulme Ct, Apt 108, Stanford CA 94305, United States of America, italgam@stanford.edu
Co-Author: Tim Roughgarden,Stanford, 353 Serra Street, Stanford, United States of America, tim@cs.stanford.edu
Abstract: The matching literature has recently begun to consider priors on agents’ utilities. One of the barriers to adopting this potentially very fruitful approach is that priors add significant informational assumptions to the model. We survey a successful alternative approach from mechanism design called prior independence, which alleviates such assumptions while still reaping most benefits. We discuss both sampling-based methods and methods based on ensuring sufficient competition in the market.
Title: The structure of the core in assignment markets
Presenting Author: Yash Kanoria,Columbia Business School, 404 Uris Hall, New York NY 10027, United States of America, ykanoria@columbia.edu
Co-Author: Daniela Saban,Columbia University, Uris Hall, 4I, New York, United States of America, dhs2131@columbia.edu
Jay Sethuraman,Columbia University, IEOR Department, New York, United States of America, jay@ieor.columbia.edu
Abstract: Assignment markets (Shapley & Shubik 1971) involve matching with transfers, as in labor markets and housing markets. We consider a two-sided assignment market with agent types and stochastic structure similar to models used in empirical studies. Each agent has a randomly drawn "productivity" associated with each type on the other side. We characterize how the structure of the core, i.e., the set of stable outcomes, is determined by market characteristics.

Thursday, February 18, 2010

SF School Board Meeting, Feb 17: new choice system


At the latest public meeting of the San Francisco Board of Education (last night, Wednesday, Feb. 17), the commissioners and the public were engaged in a detailed discussion of the algorithms and priorities being proposed for the new school choice system.

Muriel Niederle explains and answers questions about the new Assignment with Transfers school choice plans being proposed (with variations for elementary school, middle school, and high schools). She comes on just after minute 36 of this video of the 3 hour meeting, and her presentation, interspersed with questions and answers, continues for a little over an hour (to minute 1:39), although she's back answering questions at the end again. Also presenting the general plan and answering questions is Orla O'Keefe, the SFUSD official leading the effort to design the new school choice system.

There's something very encouraging about seeing the public policy discussion focusing on choice systems that are non-wasteful (Pareto efficient, for you economists), strategically simple for parents (so that truthful preference revelation is a dominant strategy), and flexible (so that the school board can tweak the system in years to come without harming the first two properties). The 'political' issues are the priorities that different children have at different schools.

Another attractive aspect of the proposal (discussed by Ms. O'Keefe following Muriel's presentation) is that data would be collected each year for continual monitoring of how the choice and assignment system is working.

The discussion touches on a number of interesting questions. (Even if the algorithm makes truthful preference revelation the best strategy, there are still issues of checking e.g. addresses in any system in which priorities at schools depend on home address...). But it looks like SF is well launched on adopting a sensible, workable, well thought out and flexible framework.

Tuesday, February 23, 2010

Choosing schools (in NYC and SF)

I've written elswhere about the school choice process for public schools in San Francisco and for high schools in New York City. But, regardless of whether the process is a good one or not, the problem facing parents who have to decide how much they like each school can be a tough one, especially if there are a lot of schools.

Two articles help you feel the pain:

New Plan on School Selection, but Still Discontent discusses San Francisco, and
It’s a nightmare to apply for high schools in city discusses New York.

Some more background information here.

HT: Parag Pathak

Sunday, November 21, 2010

Strategy-proofness and strategy sets: residency fraud in school choice

When we speak of strategy-proofness in the context of school choice, we are most often speaking about whether it is safe for parents to reveal their true preferences when asked to submit a rank ordering of possible school assignments. Of course, parents have other private information as well, and they may have incentives to misprepresent that also.

I'm reminded of this by the fact that the San Francisco Unified School District has recently sent a letter to the address of record to each student regarding an Amnesty Period for Residency Fraud.
(It includes the line "This letter is directed to families that have committed residency fraud. Parents/Guardians who have never submitted false residency information to the District may disregard this letter.")

Monday, March 26, 2012

Joel Klein on school choice

Joel Klein, who was Chancellor of NYC schools when school choice was introduced in New York City high schools, writes in the Daily News: Harness the power of school choice: Competition works in education, too


Of course, details matter: see yesterday's post on an effort that didn't quite work out as planned, in San Francisco. Yesterday's post also has links to some school choice efforts that seem quite promising, however.

Monday, April 30, 2018

Deferred rejection: longer college admission wait lists

College waiting lists are a bit of a misnomer--they aren't ordered lists, they are more like waiting pools from which candidates can be drawn if the yield from regular admissions falls short.

The WSJ has the story:
College Wait Lists Are Ballooning as Schools Struggle to Predict Enrollment
The chance of getting off the wait list has plummeted at many schools as the pool has expanded

"As hundreds of thousands of high-school seniors face a May 1 deadline to put down deposits at their college of choice, many still face uncertainty over where they will end up. Their futures are clouded by the schools’ use of wait lists to make sure they have the right number, and type, of students come fall.

"The University of Virginia increased the number of applicants invited onto wait lists by 68% between 2015 and 2017. At Lehigh University, that figure rose by 54%. And at Ohio State University, it more than tripled.
...
"[Carnegie Mellon University], with a target of 1,550 freshmen, offered wait-list spots to just over 5,000 applicants this year.

"“You can take stock and ‘fix’ or refine the class by gender, income, geography, major or other variables,” said Jon Reider, director of college counseling at San Francisco University High School. “A large waiting list gives you greater flexibility in filling these gaps.”

"This year, applications to Carnegie Mellon rose 19%. With more students accepting its offers of admission, it couldn’t risk over-enrolling. The school admitted 500 fewer students and expects to go to some of its wait lists to make sure each undergraduate program meets enrollment goals, and that there is a good mix of students, including enough aspiring English majors or kids from South Dakota. The school can also take into account the financial situations of wait-listed candidates."

Wednesday, October 8, 2025

New Fellows of the Econometric Society

 The Econometric Society has announced the results of the 2025 election of new Fellows.

Congratulations to all of them. It's a great list, that includes important market designers and  experimental/behavioral economists.

"The Society is pleased to announce the election of 25 new Fellows of the Econometric Society. The 2025 Fellows of the Econometric Society follow.

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Duke University
S. Nageeb Ali, Pennsylvania State University
Heather Anderson, Monash University
Debopam Bhattacharya, University of Cambridge
Francis Bloch, Universite Paris 1 and Paris School of Economics
Eric Budish, University of Chicago Booth School of Business
Yi-Chun Chen, National University of Singapore
Xavier D’Haultfoeuille, CREST-ENSAE
Cecile Gaubert, University of California, Berkeley
Bryan Graham, University of California, Berkeley
Nathaniel Hendren, MIT
Oscar Jorda, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco/University of California, Davis
Anil K Kashyap, University of Chicago Booth School of Business
Jinwoo Kim, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Frank Kleibergen, University of Amsterdam
Ivana Komunjer, Georgetown University
Leslie Marx, Duke University
Edward Miguel, University of California, Berkeley
Debasis Mishra, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi
Tymofiy Mylovanov, Kyiv School of Economics and University of Pittsburgh
Fabrizio Perri, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
David Romer, University of California, Berkeley
Roland Strausz, Humboldt University of Berlin
Francesco Trebbi, University of California, Berkeley
Eyal Winter, Lancaster University and the Hebrew University"

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In each of the years 2020-2024 the lists of new Fellows have been somewhat longer, and my sense is that we should keep trying to have longer lists, because we're  we're systematically missing many who would be jolly good Fellows.