tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4748060798655400108.post2786074413192646635..comments2023-11-02T08:55:35.510-07:00Comments on Market Design: Signaling for interviews in the Economics Job Market: Registration opens tomorrowAl Rothhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02232854038397912604noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4748060798655400108.post-55280180368191586112009-11-16T09:48:55.899-08:002009-11-16T09:48:55.899-08:00For an interesting study of optimal signaling in j...For an interesting study of optimal signaling in job markets: "Signaling in matching markets"<br /><br />http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workshops/papers/Theory/ColesKushnirNiederle_sigmatch.pdfcgarnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4748060798655400108.post-75014079372142303102009-11-15T08:30:20.263-08:002009-11-15T08:30:20.263-08:00Of the signals I sent, they both "worked"...Of the signals I sent, they both "worked". Would I have gotten the interviews anyways, maybe....but I think in particular when you have a chance to tell an employer otherwise that you are interested in a job for geographic reasons (close to family, friends) it can be a great tool. A signal to MIT, probably useless because everybody would want to go there.Awesome0https://www.blogger.com/profile/07054916134212640751noreply@blogger.com