Monday, July 2, 2018

Kidney exchange in all its aspects: a view from India

Here's a survey that sees kidney exchange, and all the advances that have been made in how to use it to facilitate more transplants, as a force for making medicine more inclusive around the world.

Kidney exchange transplantation current status, an update and future perspectives
Vivek B Kute, Narayan Prasad, Pankaj R Shah, Pranjal R Modi
World J Transplant. Jun 28, 2018; 8(3): 52-60
Published online Jun 28, 2018. doi: 10.5500/wjt.v8.i3.52

Abstract: "Kidney exchange transplantation is well established modality to increase living donor kidney transplantation. Reasons for joining kidney exchange programs are ABO blood group incompatibility, immunological incompatibility (positive cross match or donor specific antibody), human leukocyte antigen (HLA) incompatibility (poor HLA matching), chronological incompatibility and financial incompatibility. Kidney exchange transplantation has evolved from the traditional simultaneous anonymous 2-way kidney exchange to more complex ways such as 3-way exchange, 4-way exchange, n-way exchange,compatible pair, non-simultaneous kidney exchange,non-simultaneous extended altruistic donor, never ending altruistic donor, kidney exchange combined with desensitization, kidney exchange combined with ABO incompatible kidney transplantation, acceptable mismatch transplant, use of A2 donor to O patients, living donor-deceased donor list exchange, domino chain, non-anonymous kidney exchange, single center, multicenter, regional, National, International and Global kidney exchange. Here we discuss recent advances in kidney exchanges such as International kidney exchange transplantation in a global environment, three categories of advanced donation program, deceased donors as a source of chain initiating kidneys, donor renege myth or reality, pros and cons of anonymity in developed world and (non-) anonymity in developing world, pros and cons of donor travel vs kidney transport, algorithm for management of incompatible donor-recipient pairs and pros and cons of Global kidney exchange. The participating transplant teams and donor-recipient pairs should make the decision by consensus about kidney donor travel vs kidney transport and anonymity vs non-anonymity in allocation as per local resources and logistics. Future of organ transplantation in resource-limited setting will be liver vs kidney exchange, a legitimate hope or utopia?"

An interesting section of the paper discusses different practices regarding anonymity in kidney exchange centers in different countries:

"PROS AND CONS OF ANONYMITY IN DEVELOPED WORLD AND (NON-) ANONYMITY IN DEVELOPING WORLD
There is disparity on standard practice of kidney exchange in developed and developing World in term of (non-) anonymity. There is variable practice on anonymity before and after surgery in different countries.
Conditional approach[38]: When the donor-recipient pairs give consent for meeting after surgery, they are allowed to meet each other after surgery in some countries such as the United States of America[39] and the United Kingdom[40]. In other countries, such as the Netherlands and Sweden[41], anonymity is absolute. Anonymity protects patients, donors and transplant hospital/ administration against the risks of revoking anonymity and prevents further commercialization of organs, and breach of patient donor privacy. An Ethical, Legal and Psychosocial Aspects of Organ Transplantation (ELPAT), a subsection of the European Society for Organ Transplantation reported that a conditional approach to anonymity should be possible after surgery[42]. Pronk et al[38] showed that most donor-recipient pairs who participated in anonymous donation process are in favour of a conditional approach to anonymity. Guidelines on how to revoke anonymity if both parties agree are needed and should include education about pros and cons of (non-) anonymity and a logistical plan on how, when, where, and by whom anonymity should be revoked.
Non-anonymous allocation[11,12]: Donor-recipient pairs are allowed to meet each other before allocation of donor for surgery and even after surgery. They can share medical reports of exchange donors before surgery and kidney transplant and donor surgery outcome after surgery. Donor-recipient pairs do not choose their match but donor-recipient pairs may decline a match or can withdraw from participation in the kidney exchange program at any time, for any reason. Non-anonymous allocation has the potential of commercialization of organs in case of compatible donor-recipient pairs along with breach in privacy of donor-recipient pairs. Kute et al[11,12] reported that donor-recipient pairs are willing for non-anonymous allocation process in single center study of 300 kidney exchange transplants in India. They reported that non-anonymity is more helpful in manual allocation in absence of computer software allocation which also increases trust between patients, donors and transplant hospital/administration and legal team. More long term prospective studies are required to explore the donor and recipient perspective on anonymity in living kidney donation in different socio-economic regions and countries."

Regarding Global Kidney Exchange they conclude:
"Global kidney exchange appears to provide life-saving kidney transplantation to poor donor-recipient pairs from developing countries that otherwise could die due to economic constrain[50-53]."

And here's their conclusion:
CONCLUSION
"Kidney exchange transplantation has increased living donor kidney transplantation for end stage renal disease patients with chronological incompatibility and financial incompatibility. The participating transplant teams and donor-recipient pairs should make the decision by consensus about kidney donor travel vs kidney transport and anonymity vs non-anonymity in allocation as per local resources and logistics. There is need of uniform algorithm for management of incompatible donor-recipient pairs."

Sunday, July 1, 2018

Ariel Pakes gives the Arrow Lecture in Jerusalem

If you're in Jerusalem tomorrow, you have a chance to hear Ariel Pakes' Arrow Lecture:

17:00-18:00 Ariel Pakes, Arrow lecture:
Learning and Equilibrium in A New Market

It is part of

The 29th Jerusalem Summer School of Economics

Industrial Organization

Event date: June 26 - July 5, 2018 

Organizers:
    Eric Maskin, General Director (Harvard University)
    Ariel Pakes, Codirector (Harvard University)
    Elchanan Ben-Porath,Codirector (The Hebrew University)


    Industrial Organization studies how markets are structured and the way they respond to changes in conditions (e.g., to policy revisions). The field draws heavily on both theory and empirical work, and both will be amply represented in the Summer School. We will focus on several topics of current research interest: vertical markets, allocation in markets without prices, market dynamics, and regulation.

      
    List of speakers:
    NAMEAFFILIATIONEMAILTOPICS
    Nikhil AgarwalMassachusetts Institute of Technologyagarwaln@mit.eduThe analysis of centralized market allocation mechanisms
    John AskerThe University of Californiajohnaskecr@econ.ucla.eduThe analysis of regulation
    Alon Eizenberg The Hebrew University of Jerusalem      aloneiz@mscc.huji.ac.ilThe analysis of regulation
    Myrto KalouptsidiHarvard University myrto@fas.harvard.eduThe analysis of market dynamics
    Robin LeeHarvard Universityrobinlee@fas.harvard.eduThe   analysis of   vertical markets
    Eric Maskin         Harvard Universityemaskin@fas.harvard.edu The analysis of market dynamics
    Ariel PakesHarvard Universityapakes@fas.harvard.eduThe analysis of market dynamics
    Parag PathakMassachusetts Institute of Technologyppathak@mit.eduThe analysis of centralized market allocation mechanisms
    Mike WhinstonMassachusetts Institute of Technologywhinston@mit.eduThe analysis of vertical markets
    Ali YurukogluStanford Universityayurukog@stanford.eduThe analysis of regulation
Here's a link to the full program.

There will be several sessions on matching markets:
Wednesday, July 4
9:30-11:00 Parag Pathak: Introduction to Matching Theory
11:00-11:30 Coffee Break
11:30-13:00 Nikhil Agarwal: Revealed Preference for Matching Markets

Thursday, July 5
9:30-11:00 Parag Pathak: Market Design Meets Research Design
11:00-11:30 Coffee break

11:30-13:00 Nikhil Agarwal: The Organization of Organ Markets

Saturday, June 30, 2018

Frontiers of Knowledge Awards 2018, video of the presentation ceremony

Presentation ceremony of the 10th edition of the Frontiers of Knowledge Awards

18/06/2018





Bill Nordhaus at the BBVA Award ceremony
Rob Porter, Ariel Pakes, and Tim Bresnahan
 The celebration and speech of Bill Nordhaus runs from minutes 32:15-40:00 in the above video








The celebration of Tim Bresnahan, Ariel Pakes and Rob Porter, and the speech by Pakes on the behalf of all of them, run from 46:05-51:20 in the above video.








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See my earlier post,

Tuesday, February 20, 2018

Friday, June 29, 2018

Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design (my Presidential address in the July AER)

Here is the paper that grew out of my Presidential address as I stepped down from the AEA presidency in January. It attempts to summarize my current views on market design.

Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design




Download Full Text PDF 
(Complimentary)




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Here's the video of my delivery of a preliminary version of this longish paper as a (relatively) short (1 hour*) talk at the AEA meetings in January, 2018:
AEA Presidential Address - Marketplaces, Markets and Market Design
Alvin E. Roth, introduced by Olivier Blanchard
View Webcast
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*the video has adjustable speed. If you listen to it at 1x, you hear it as I presented it.  If you listen to it at .5x, you hear me as my students probably do, droning slowly on. If you listen to it at 1.6 or 2x, you might not be able to hear individual words, but you can enjoy the body language...

Thursday, June 28, 2018

Kidney conference: Paris School of Economics, June 28

Kidney Allocation : Evaluation and Perspectives"
June 28, 2018
Campus Jourdan - Paris school of economics - Paris
Localisation | Location
Campus Jourdan - Paris school of economics - 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
Floor 1 - Room R1-13
 Organisateurs | Organizers
09:00 - 10:00 Peter Biro (Hungarian Academy of Sciences)
“Kidney Exchange Practices in Europe”
10:00 – 10.30 Coffee Break
10:30 - 11:30 Marie-Alice Macher (Agence de Bio-Médecine)
“Kidney transplantation with living donor versus deceased donor in France
From the subsidiarity desired by the pioneers to complementarity”
11:30 – 12:30 Victor Hiller (LEMMA, Université Panthéon-Assas)
“Perspectives on the Kidney Exchange Program in France”
joint with Audry, Combe, He, Jacquelinet, Macher, Tercieux
12:30 – 14:00 Lunch
14:00 - 15:00 Maximilien Burq (MIT)
“Effect of Match-run Frequencies on the Number of Transplants and Waiting Times in
Kidney Exchange”
joint with Ashlagi, Bingaman, Manshadi, Gamarnik, Murphey, Roth, Melcher, Rees
15:00 - 16:00 Daniel Waldinger (MIT)
“An Empirical Framework for Sequential Assignment: The Allocation of Deceased
Donor Kidneys”
joint with Agarwal, Ashlagi, Rees and Somaini
16-00 – 16:30 Coffee Break
16:30 - 17:30 Yinghua He (Rice)
“Kidney Exchange in the Shadow of Desensitization”
joint with Combe, Hiller and Tercieux

Wednesday, June 27, 2018

Alibaba forms Luohan Academy to promote research in digital economy

I just returned from a lightning visit to Hanzhou, the home of Alibaba, which is founding a research academy to study the digital economy.  It will be very interesting to see what develops.

Here are some news stories, with pictures:

Alibaba Initiates the Open Research Platform "Luohan Academy"


"HANGZHOU, China, June 27, 2018 /PRNewswire/ -- Alibaba Group Holding Limited ("Alibaba Group") (NYSE: BABA) has advocated the establishment of the "Luohan Academy" ("Academy"), an open research platform with Nobel Laureates and leading international social scientists to address universal challenges faced by societies arising from the rapid development of digital technologies."
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阿里巴巴倡议成立罗汉堂 马云:希望罗汉堂为全世界服务
(G translate: Alibaba proposes to establish Luohantang.Ma Yun: I hope Luohantang will serve the world."
Jack Ma,Tom Sargent, Al Roth, Chris Pissarides.June 26, 2018 Hangzhou
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update: here's the first photo, annotated (from http://hznews.hangzhou.com.cn/chengshi/content/2018-06/27/content_7026385.htm)


Tuesday, June 26, 2018

Skimishing over C-Band radio spectrum


Harnessing Satellite Spectrum for Broadband: Will Incumbents Sell, Stay, or Share?

"At its July meeting, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is likely to adopt an unprecedented proposal to open a large band of satellite spectrum for mobile and fixed wireless broadband.  The mid-band spectrum from 3700 to 4200 MHz has become the most sought-after resource for both future “5G” mobile networks and for extending high-capacity “fixed wireless” broadband in rural and other low-density areas where trenching fiber would cost too much or take too long.
...
"The two primary proposals under consideration involve clearing the satellite service off the lower portion of the band (boosting mobile capacity for 5G) and authorizing shared use of the unused frequencies in the remainder of the band (enabling high-capacity fixed wireless). Some stakeholders support both proposals as complementary (a “win-win”); other stakeholders oppose one or both proposals."

And this:
 Google, Intelsat spar over C-Band

"Sparks were flying almost as soon as the first keynote got underway during New America’s Open Technology Institute (OTI) event Friday that examined how things might unfold for the C-Band—the 3700-4200 MHz band that is being eyed for 5G.

"In one corner: The Google-backed effort to allow sharing in the C-Band while protecting incumbents. In another corner, a satellite industry proposal to free up 100 MHz for 5G within 18 to 36 months.

"But those were just two sides represented by the keynote speakers: Andrew Clegg, spectrum engineering lead at Google; and Hazem Moakkit, vice president for spectrum strategy at Intelsat. There are many other sides as well, including video content producers, broadcast stations, cable networks, mobile carriers and rural broadband ISPs, to name a few.
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Monday, June 25, 2018

Repugnance towards carbon emissions trading


Here's a report of an experiment motivated by a desire to understand the repugnance felt in some quarters towards emissions trading as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and other pollutants.

Clean up your own mess: An experimental study of moral responsibility and efficiency
Michael Jakob, DorotheaKübler, Jan ChristophSteckel, and Roelvan Veldhuizen
Journal of Public Economics, 155, November 2017,  138-146

It begins with a gripping account of some of this repugnance (which it uses to motivate an experiment of a more abstract sort):

"emissions trading schemes, have repeatedly faced criticism from various sides. In economics, such criticism has pointed out that emissions trading schemes are likely to face real-world constraints (e.g. related to monitoring requirements and the definition of baselines on how emissions would evolve in the absence of the scheme) that may lower their environmental effectiveness (Wara, 2007; Schneider and Kollmuss, 2015) and economic efficiency (Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005; Krey, 2005). More fundamental criticisms have been raised by philosophers, climate scientists, environmental activists, and the Church (see for example Caney, 2010 and Page, 2011 for discussions of such criticisms). These types of criticisms often rely on a moral critique equating the trading of emission permits with the medieval practice of paying money to be cleared from one's sins, as put succinctly in the Earth Island Journal (Smith, 2009):
‘Congress's new cap-and-trade scam would put the Church's indulgence scheme to shame.’

In his book ‘Storms of my Grandchildren’, the prominent climate scientist Hansen (2010) expresses a similar concern:
‘A successful new policy cannot include any offsets.[i.e., emissions trading] […] The public must be firm and unwavering in demanding “no offsets”, because this sort of monkey business is exactly the type of thing that politicians love and will try to keep. Offsets are like the indulgences that were sold by the church in the Middle Ages’.

A related argument sees carbon offsets that are used to compensate for greenhouse gas emissions as a way to ease one's conscience without changing behavior. As George Monbiot (2006) writes in “The Guardian”:
Our guilty consciences appeased, we continue to fill up our SUVs and fly round the world without the least concern about our impact on the planet … it's like pushing the food around on your plate to create the impression that you have eaten it’.

The Catholic Church has also taken a critical stance on emissions trading, most notably in Francis's (2015) widely discussed encyclical ‘Laudato Si’:
‘The strategy of buying and selling “carbon credits” can lead to a new form of speculation which would not help reduce the emission of polluting gases worldwide. This system seems to provide a quick and easy solution under the guise of a certain commitment to the environment, but in no way does it allow for the radical change which present circumstances require. Rather, it may simply become a ploy which permits maintaining the excessive consumption of some countries and sectors’. (Para. 171)

These statements capture the two types of criticisms of emissions trading established by Page (2011). First, emissions trading may fail to bring about long-term behavioral change required for successful climate change mitigation and undermine intrinsic incentives for environmentally friendly behavior. Second, it may violate non-consequential objectives of justice and fairness (see also Caney, 2010).
Hence, there appears to be a strong presumption that monetarily compensating for an environmental externality is not morally equivalent to changing one's behavior to avoid the externality, even if both courses of action result in identical outcomes. This raises the question of why people object to such compensation-based mechanisms. In this study, we hypothesize that people may have a preference to ‘clean up their own mess,’ that is, prefer to personally eliminate environmental externalities they are responsible for."

Sunday, June 24, 2018

Visiting Hangzhou

I'm on my way to Hangzhou, via Shanghai, for a meeting called by Alibaba.  I'll only be there for two busy days.
Read all about it:

问大家!和诺奖获得者面对面聊人类未来你来不来?


Here are some others who are coming
1.Patrick Bolton (帕特里克·博尔顿):哥伦比亚大学教授,美国艺术与科学院院士、英国科学院院士、美国金融学会院士,当代最著名的金融学家之一。
2、Markus Brunnermeier(马科斯·布鲁纳米尔):普林斯顿大学Bendheim金融中心主任,美国国家经济研究中心和经济政策研究中心成员,撰写有大量关于金融危机和货币政策的著作。
3、Bengt Holmstrom (本特·霍姆斯特罗姆):麻省理工学院教授,美国人文与科学院院士,契约理论的奠基人之一,2016年获得诺贝尔经济学奖。
4、Josh Lerner (杰斯·勒那):哈佛商学院教授,100位对私募行业最有影响力的学者之一,研究主要集中在风险投资机构的结构和作用。
5、Preston McAfee (普斯顿·麦法宜):前谷歌战略技术主管、微软首席经济学家,重视根据微观经济学基础,提出商业战略和竞争解决办法。
6、Christopher A. Pissarides(克里斯托弗·皮萨里德斯):伦敦经济学院教授,英国社会科学院院士,2010年因在市场搜寻理论和宏观经济方面的突出贡献获得诺贝尔经济学奖。
7、Yingyi Qian(钱颖一):清华大学经济与管理研究院院长,制度经济学的代表人物,2012年当选为世界计量经济学会会士、2018年当选为清华大学首批文科资深教授。
8、Alvin E. Roth(阿尔文·罗思):哈佛商学院教授,美国文理科学院院士,美国经济学会主席,在博弈论、市场设计与实验经济学取得卓越贡献,2012年获得诺贝尔经济学奖。
9、Thomas Sargent(托马斯·萨金特):纽约大学教授,理性预期学派的领袖人物,擅长总体经济学、货币经济学、时间序列等领域,2011年获诺贝尔经济学奖。
10、Michael Spence (迈克尔·斯宾塞):美国社会科学院院士,提出的信息不对称理论为广泛的市场理论奠定了基础,形成了现代信息经济学的核心,2001年获得诺贝尔经济学奖。
11、Steve Tadelis (史蒂文·泰迪里斯):加州大学伯克利分校哈斯商学院教授,研究致力于理解企业和市场的契约机制如何影响价值创造,著有《博弈论导论》等。
12、Neng Wang(王能):美国哥伦比亚大学商学院教授、上海财经大学金融学院院长,研究领域包括公司金融学,宏观经济学,资产定价理论,私募及对冲基金等。
13、Shangjin Wei(魏尚进):美国哥伦比亚商学院金融学经济学教授,美国国民经济研究局中国经济研究组主任。主要研究领域为国际金融、国际贸易、政府治理和改革、中国经济以及宏观经济学。
14.、Wei Xiong (熊伟):普林斯顿大学教授,香港中文大学(深圳)经管学院院长,国际顶级期刊《Journal of Finance》联合主编,研究领域包括投机泡沫、金融危机、行为金融学等。
15、Chengang Xu (许成钢):长江商学院教授、香港大学经济学教授,中国政府治理研究的基石,2013年获孙冶方经济科学奖。

Saturday, June 23, 2018

Who accepts which deceased donor kidneys? Agarwal, Ashlagi, Somaini and Waldinger in the AEA P&P


Dynamic Incentives in Wait List Mechanisms






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Friday, June 22, 2018

Tuneups for kidney exchange by Agarwal, Aslahi, Azevedo, Featherstone and Karaduman

From the May 2018, first issue of the AEA (not R) Papers and Proceedings:
What Matters for the Productivity of Kidney Exchange?
Nikhil Agarwal
Itai Ashlagi
Eduardo Azevedo
Clayton Featherstone
Ömer Karaduman


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