Sunday, June 17, 2018

Title IX reporting incentives and mis-incentives

The Atlantic has a story on a strange Title IX case (and a resulting lawsuit), with the suggestion that it might have to do with perverse legal and procedural incentives:

Mutually Nonconsensual Sex

Here's the critical paragraph:
"The event in précis, as summarized by Robby Soave of Reason magazine:
“Male and female student have a drunken hookup. He wakes up, terrified she's going to file a sexual misconduct complaint, so he goes to the Title IX office and beats her to the punch. She is found guilty and suspended.”

HT: MR

Saturday, June 16, 2018

The market for fake phone numbers

I am not of an age at which I get unwelcome requests for my phone number that I can't simply decline, but if you are, Lifehacker has some suggestions of numbers you could give to creepy strangers:

Give Out These Fake Prank Numbers to Creeps

These two make it clear what is likely the demand side of this market.

  • (646) 926-6614: The Mary Sue Rejection Hotline, which will say, “Oh hello there. If you’re hearing this message, you’ve made a woman feel unsafe and/or disrespected. Please learn to take no for an answer and respect women’s emotional and physical autonomy.  

  • (605) 475-6968: The Rejection Hotline, which politely explains to the individual that whoever gave them this number is not into them.

Friday, June 15, 2018

FRONTIERS OF MARKET DESIGN, June 22 at Cornell

Cornell is a hotbed of market design these days: here's the second conference there next week.
FRONTIERS OF MARKET DESIGN

"The first Frontiers of Market Design workshop will be held in Cornell University, Ithaca, NY on June 22, 2018 in conjunction with the 19th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC).
Market design is a field of applied and theoretical research that sits comfortably on the intersection of economics and computer science. In recent decades, the theory and applications of market design have blossomed. In this workshop, we will focus on a set of promising, new applications of market design. In particular, we are interested in applications of market design which involve complex allocation constraints, vast datasets, and dynamic pricing issues. We also want to explore problems which, despite receiving ample theoretical attention, have not been implemented in practice. We welcome theoretical and empirical papers that deal with new domains of market design as well as papers that discuss practical aspects of market design."


Thursday, June 14, 2018

Workshop on Mathematical Optimization in Market Design, June 18-19

Two market design conferences to be held at Cornell next week: Here's the program for the first one.

INFORMS Workshop Mathematical Optimization 

and Market Design 2018


June 18, 2018

8:00-8:30 am Registration and Breakfast


8:30-8:45 am 
Workshop Opening 
Martin Bichler, Bob Day

8:45-9:30 am  Talk (Chair: Martin Bichler)Solving Large Incomplete-Information Extensive-Form Games, and Beating the Top Human Professionals at Heads-Up No-Limit Texas Hold'em
Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University

9:30-9:45 am Coffee Break 

9:45-11:15 am Session (Chair: Bob Day)
Optimization and Pricing in Non-Convex Markets

Allocation Under Stochastic Demand: A Primal-Dual Approach
Sasa Pekec, Duke University

Competitive Equilibria in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers
Stefan Waldherr, Technical University of Munich (with Martin Bichler)

Linear Prices in Combinatorial Auctions
Bob Day, University of Connecticut

11:15-11:30 am Coffee Break 

11:30-1:00 pm Session (Chair: Ben Lubin)
Iterative Combinatorial AuctionsAn Efficient Ascending Auction for Private Valuations
Oleg Baranov, University of Colorado

Adaptive-Price Combinatorial Auctions
Sebastien Lahaie, Google (with Ben Lubin, Boston University)

Machine Learning-Based Combinatorial Auctions
Ben Lubin, Boston University (with Sven Seuken and Gianluca Brero, Zurich University)
1:00-2:00 pm Lunch Break 

2:00-3:00 pm Session (Chair: Itai Ashlagi)
Matching with Constraints and Complex Preferences

Hidden Substitutes
Scott Kominers, Harvard Business School

Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations
Itai Ashlagi, Stanford University

3:00-3:10 pm Break 

3:10-4:30 pm Panel DiscussionBeyond Strategyproofness
Panel Chair: Martin Bichler, Technical Univ. of Munich 
Panelists: Eric Budish, Univ. of Chicago; Peter Cramton, Cologne Univ.; Michal Feldman, Tel-Aviv Univ.

4:30-4:40 pm Coffee Break 

4:40-5:30 pm Talk (Chair: Ben Lubin)
Markets for Road Use: Eliminating Congestion through Scheduling, Routing, and Real-time Road Pricing,
Peter Cramton, Cologne University (with R. Richard Geddes and Axel Ockenfels)

6 pm Joint Reception with ACM EC at the Gates Hall

June 19, 2018

9:00-10:30 am ACM EC Opening Session and Keynote
  
10:30-12:00 noon Session (Chair: Thayer Morrill)
Market Models and Applications

Quantity Contingent Auctions and Allocation of Airport Slots 
Michael Ball, University of Maryland

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
Michal Feldman, Tel-Aviv University

Family Ties:  Incorporating Siblings into School Choice
Thayer Morrill, NCSU

12:00-12:10 pm Break

12:10-12:55 pm Talk (Chair: Thayer Morrill)
Market Design and the FCC Incentive Auction
Larry Ausubel, University of Maryland  (with Christina Aperjis and Oleg Baranov)

Tuesday, June 12, 2018

Battle over college admission application platforms

CollegeNET, a software vendor to colleges, is suing the Common App., and also providing software support for it's newer competitor, the  Coalition for Access, Affordability, and Success.

 The Chronicle of Higher Ed has the (gated) story:

How Admissions Competition Brought New Rivalries, Strange Bedfellows, and ‘An Us-Versus-Us Lawsuit’  By Eric Hoover JUNE 03, 2018

"CollegeNET’s complaint claims that the Common Application used unfair tactics to stomp competitors and monopolize the market. It also claims that participating colleges (though not named as defendants) colluded to limit spending on application-processing services, harming other companies as well as applicants. How? By homogenizing the application process and causing "application churn," in which students apply to more and more colleges."


See earlier post:

Tuesday, September 29, 2015

Monday, June 11, 2018

The market for blood plasma: different tissues, same issues

I'll be speaking at The Plasma Protein Forum, June 12-13 in Washington D.C., on "REPUGNANT TRANSACTIONS AND FORBIDDEN MARKETS: DIFFERENT TISSUES, SAME ISSUES"

Here's the whole program:

DAY ONE:    JUNE 12, 2018

7:00 am–5:30 pmRegistration and Exhibit Hall Open
7:00–8:30 amBreakfast—Available in Exhibit Halls 1 & 2
8:30–8:45 amWELCOME & “How Is Your Day?Jan M. Bult, President & CEO, PPTA
8:45–9:00 amCHAIRMAN'S MESSAGE
David Bell, Chair, PPTA Global Board of Directors; Executive Vice President & General Counsel, Grifols
9:00–10:30 am  PERSPECTIVES: ACCESS TO CARE
Moderator:  Larisa Cervenakova, M.D., Ph.D., Medical Director, PPTA
Speakers: 
  • Tony Castaldo, President, US Hereditary Angioedema AssociationHAE perspective
  • Joanna Chorostowska-Wynimko M.D., Ph.D., D.Sc., Professor, Scientific Director National Institute of Tuberculosis and Lung Diseases, Warsaw, Poland
    Alpha-1 perspective

  • Professor Paolo Caraceni, Associate Professor, Department of Medical and Surgical Sciences, University of Bologna, Bologna, ItalyANSWER: Long term albumin administration improves survival in patients with decompensated cirrhosis
10:3011:00 amBREAK
11:00 am–12:30 pm  CURRENT INDUSTRY AND REGULATORY INITIATIVES IN THE AREAS OF INSPECTIONS AND DONOR HEALTH
Moderator:  John Delacourt, Vice President Legal Affairs & Global Operations, PPTA
Speakers:
  • Ginette Y. Michaud, M.D., Director, Office of Biological Products Operations, U.S. Food & Drug AdministrationFDA’s Office of Biological Products Operations – Form Follows Function
  • Toby L. Simon, M.D., Senior Medical Director, Plasma & Plasma Safety, CSL PlasmaDonor health perspectives: Insights from industry plasma vigilance data and future safety initiatives
  • George B. Schreiber, Sc.D., DirectorEpidemiology, PPTA
    Iron depletion in Source plasma donors; A non sequitur.
12:30–2:00 pm
LUNCHBuffet Available in Exhibit Halls 1 & 2    Sponsored by:  DIAMOND Roche Logo 01
2:00–4:00 pm  INTERNATIONAL ACCESS TO CARE LANDSCAPE
Moderator:  Jan M. Bult, President & CEO, PPTA
Speakers:
  • P. Martin van Hagen, M.D., Ph.D., Professor, Head, Clinical Immunology Unit Department of Internal Medicine, Erasmus Medical Center, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
    Is personalized medicine a national or cross border issue?
  • Dr. Ranjeet S. Ajmani, CEO, PlasmaGen BioSciences Pvt Ltd.
    Initiatives to improve access to care in India
  • Antonio Condino-Neto, M.D., Ph.D., President, Latin American Society for Immunodeficiencies (LASID)What needs to be done to improve access to Immunoglobulin therapy in Brazil? Diagnosis, Access, Supply
4:00 pm BREAK – Ice cream social
4:30 pmOtto Schwarz Award presentation
5:00 pmREPUGNANT TRANSACTIONS AND FORBIDDEN MARKETS: DIFFERENT TISSUES, SAME ISSUES
  • Alvin E. Roth, Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics, Stanford University; George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration, Emeritus, Harvard University; and 2012 recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
5:45 pmDAY 1 CLOSING ANNOUNCEMENTS
5:45–7:30 pmReception        PPTA How is your day logo v2

DAY TWO:    JUNE 13, 2018

7:30 am–1:00 pmRegistration and Exhibit Hall open
7:30–8:30 amBreakfast—Available in Exhibit Halls 1 & 2
8:30–8:35 amWELCOME
Joshua Penrod, J.D., Ph.D., Vice President, Source & International Affairs, PPTA

8:35–8:50 amSOURCE DIVISION OUTLOOK
Roger Brinser, ‎Chair, PPTA Source Board of Directors; Director, Regulatory, BioLife Plasma Services/Shire

8:50–11:00 am CURRENT CHALLENGES 
Moderator: Joshua Penrod, J.D., Ph.D., Vice President, Source & International Affairs, PPTA
Speakers:
  • Nicola Lacetera, Ph.D., Associate Professor at the University of Toronto
    Crowding Out
  • Prof Dr. Liu ZhongVice President, Institute of Blood Transfusion, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (CAMS)Which is safer source plasma for manufacturing in China: apheresis plasma or recovered plasma?
  • Chen BinDeputy Director, Medical Safety and Transfusion Division, Department of Medical Regulatory and Management, National Health CommissionThe current situation and challenge of the Chinese plasma management

11:00–11:30 amBREAK
11:30 am–1:00 pm CAN COUNTRIES DELIVER ON THEIR OWN?
Moderator:  Julia Fabens, Senior Manager International Affairs, PPTA

Speakers:
  • Bill Bees, Vice President, Plasma Technologies, Prometic Plasma ResourcesCanada–Debunking the Krever Commission Report
  • Peter Jaworski, Ph.D., Professor, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
    Ethics of Compensation
  • Joshua Penrod, J.D., Ph.D., Vice President, Source & International Affairs, PPTAGlobal sufficiency: Obstacles and opportunities

***********
Here are my blog posts on plasma, sorted by date (most recent first), going back to one from 2009.

Sunday, June 10, 2018

Computing fairness

One of the areas in which computer science and economics touch each other more than a bit is in understanding what constitutes a fair way of allocating scarce resources.  This was the subject of a recent Northwestern CS workshop:

Quarterly Theory Workshop: Algorithmic Fairness

"Synopsis: As algorithmic systems have increasingly been deployed to make consequential decisions, it is becoming urgent that we grapple with the problem of (un)fairness and discrimination. These are delicate issues — to think rigorously about them, we first need to figure out how to formally define what we want, and then reason about how we might go about achieving our goals algorithmically — and what tradeoffs we will have to manage. This workshop focuses on recent advances in the theory of algorithmic fairness: both on foundational definitional questions, and on algorithmic techniques. The speakers are Nicole Immorlica (MSR), Jon Kleinberg (Cornell), Omer Reingold (Stanford), and Aaron Roth (U. of Pennsylvania).
The technical program of this workshop is organized by Aaron Roth and Jason Hartline."

These were the talks:
Speaker: Jon Kleinberg
Title: Algorithmic Fairness Criteria for Evaluating Individuals and Sets
Abstract: Recent discussion in the public sphere about classification by algorithms has involved tension between competing notions of what it means for such a classification to be fair to different groups. We consider several of the key fairness conditions that lie at the heart of these debates, and discuss recent research establishing inherent trade-offs between these conditions. We also consider a variety of methods for promoting fairness and related notions for classification and selection problems that involve sets rather than just individuals.
This talk is based on joint work with Sendhil Mullainathan, Manish Raghavan, and Maithra Raghu.
Speaker: Aaron Roth
Title: Preventing Fairness Gerrymandering in Machine Learning
Abstract: The most prevalent notions of fairness in machine learning are statistical notions: they fix a small collection of high-level, pre-defined groups (such as race or gender), and then ask for approximate parity of some statistic of the classifier (like positive classification rate or false positive rate) across these groups. Constraints of this form are susceptible to (intentional or inadvertent) fairness gerrymandering, in which a classifier appears to be fair on each individual group, but badly violates the fairness constraint on one or more structured subgroups defined over the protected attributes (such as certain combinations of protected attribute values). Individual notions of fairness avoid this problem, but at the cost of needing to make often unrealistic assumptions about the setting. We propose instead to demand statistical notions of fairness across exponentially (or infinitely) many subgroups, defined by a structured class of functions over the protected attributes. We will show how to achieve this in polynomial time, under the assumption that we are given oracles for solving the unconstrained learning problems (for both the set of classifiers to be learned, and the set of subgroups to be protected). Our algorithm casts the problem as solving for an equilibrium in a zero sum game, and observes that learning oracles are enough to efficiently play no-regret learning dynamics. We then demonstrate experimentally that our proposed algorithms are practical, by investigating their performance on several real datasets when instantiated with learning heuristics in place of oracles.
This talk is based on joint work with Michael Kearns, Seth Neel, and Steven Wu.
Speaker: Omer Reingold
Title: On Algorithmic Fairness Between Groups and Individuals 
Abstract: As algorithms increasingly inform and influence decisions made about individuals, it is increasingly important to address concerns that these algorithms might be discriminatory. Historically, definitions of fairness fell into one of two extremes: (1) broad-strokes statistical guarantees; (2) individual-level protections. Statistical guarantees tend to be much easier to satisfy (information and complexity theoretically), but tend to be much weaker in the protections they provide. We will discuss two recent works towards bridging the gap between statistical and individual protections. These works provide efficient learning algorithms that also ensure every subpopulation within some rich class is protected (according to some fairness notion).
One of the notions we will discuss is that of multicalibration — a new measure of algorithmic fairness that aims to mitigate concerns about discrimination that is introduced in the process of learning a predictor from data. The second notion studies fair classification within the versatile framework of Dwork et al. [ITCS 2012], which assumes the existence of a metric that measures similarity between pairs of individuals. Unlike previous works on metric-based fairness, we study the setting where a learning algorithm does not know the entire metric, but can query similarities between particular pairs of individuals a bounded number of times. We note that we do not make any assumption on the metric and are still able to obtain meaningful protection from systemic discrimination that we refer to as “metric multifairness.”
The talk will be focused on the various ways in which algorithmic fairness can be defined but will also elude to some of the ways in which it can be obtained. It is based on joint works with Úrsula Hébert-Johnson, Michael P. Kim and Guy Rothblum.
Speaker: Nicole Immorlica
Title: Fair Classification and Learning
Abstract:  Classification, learning, and optimization algorithms are increasingly used to make decisions of social consequence. An automated resume reader classifies applicants, deciding which are worth interviewing. A learning algorithm estimates the impact of a drug on health outcomes. A facility location algorithm chooses where to locate new warehouses. For these algorithms to be useful, practitioners strive to maximize their accuracy and optimality. However, this can result in differential treatment across population subgroups, resulting in a sense of inequity. Fairness metrics are used to measure the degree of inequity. In this talk, we explore how to jointly optimize fairness and accuracy using, as a black box, existing algorithms that optimize accuracy or optimality. Our first solution is tailored to classification tasks and proposes decoupling the classification task, using different classifiers for each subgroup. Our second solution can optimize any smooth and continuous function of accuracy and fairness in classification, learning, and optimization settings. It further has the advantage that subgroup membership, while used to train, is not used at run time. This additional power comes with the cost of added computational complexity in training.

Saturday, June 9, 2018

Gaming the Affordable Care Act (ACA)

One of the big lessons of market design is that participants have big strategy sets. Here's a new paper that explores some of what that has implied about how the Affordable Care Act is gamed by some participants.

Take-Up, Drop-Out, and Spending in ACA Marketplaces

Rebecca DiamondMichael J. DicksteinTimothy McQuadePetra Persson

NBER Working Paper No. 24668
Issued in May 2018
NBER Program(s):Health CarePublic EconomicsIndustrial Organization 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) established health insurance marketplaces where consumers can buy individual coverage. Leveraging novel credit card and bank account micro-data, we identify new enrollees in the California marketplace and measure their health spending and premium payments. Following enrollment, we observe dramatic spikes in individuals' health care consumption. We also document widespread attrition, with more than half of all new enrollees dropping coverage before the end of the plan year. Enrollees who drop out re-time health spending to the months of insurance coverage. This drop-out behavior generates a new type of adverse selection: insurers face high costs relative to the premiums collected when they enroll strategic consumers. We show that the pattern of attrition undermines market stability and can drive insurers to exit, even absent differences in enrollees' underlying health risks. Further, using data on plan price increases, we show that insurers largely shift the costs of attrition to non-drop-out enrollees, whose inertia generates low price sensitivity. Our results suggest that campaigns to improve use of social insurance may be more efficient when they jointly target take-up and attrition.

Friday, June 8, 2018

Parag Pathak interview on designing theories for the real world

Here's the introduction, click on the link to read more, or to hear the audio recording.

Designing theories for the real world
The AEA interviews 2018 John Bates Clark Medalist Parag Pathak.
by Chris Fleisher

He’s been hailed for pushing the boundaries of market design theory while making it practical to real-world situations.
Parag Pathak is this year’s winner of the John Bates Clark Medal. The 37-year-old MIT professor has worked to improve the assignment of students to public schools, notably in Boston, and also evaluated the impacts of school choice systems on student outcomes.
And while his theoretical work has won him widespread praise, he says his engineering-oriented approach to economics has helped him figure out which problems are of greatest practical importance.  
The AEA spoke with Pathak about his research, the influence of his mentor and former AEA president Al Roth, the criticisms against economic theorists, and the opportunities to shape public policy.
An edited transcript follows and the full-length interview can be heard by clicking on the media player..."

Thursday, June 7, 2018

Salaries of new lawyers at big law firms are on the move

After a long period of stagnation, salaries of lawyers in associate positions at large law firms recently started to move, and are climbing (probably in lockstep) once again.

Above the Law has the story:
New York To $190K — No, Cravath Didn’t Make The First Move
The next associate salary war is beginning.

and here:
Salary Wars Scorecard: Which Firms Have Announced Raises? (2018)

and here

The Billion-Dollar Biglaw Firms That Have NOT Raised Associate Salaries





See earlier posts:

Sunday, July 3, 2016

Wednesday, June 6, 2018

Tuesday, June 5, 2018

Airbnb in Paris

The FT has an informative story about Airbnb's large footprint in Paris, the nuanced effects this has on the city, and French attempts at regulation:

 Airbnb: ‘It’s a cash machine. It’s magical. You are paid to go on holiday’

"The home-sharing site’s number one destination is Paris, where it stands accused of driving up rents and house prices"

Monday, June 4, 2018

The job market(s) for professional psychologists: history and current issues

Various parts of the psychology job market resolved problems of thickness, congestion and incentives by adopting centralized clearinghouses. For other parts of the job market, those issues persist. Here's a recent article, and some snippets from it regarding this history.

Recruitment and selection in health service psychology postdoctoral training: A review of the history and current issues. 
Bodin, Doug; Schmidt, Joel P.; Lemle, Russell B.; Roper, Brad L.; Goldberg, Robert W.; Hill, Kimberly R.; Perry-Parrish, Carisa; Williams, Sharon E.; Kuemmel, Angela; Siegel, Wayne.
Training and Education in Professional Psychology © 2017 American Psychological Association

2018, Vol. 12, No. 2, 74 – 81

"Pursuing a career in health service psychology involves navigating three broad stages of training: graduate school, doctoral internship, and postdoctoral training. Each stage involves distinct procedures for recruitment and selection. The purpose of this article is to review the history of and current issues involved in the recruitment and selection process for postdoctoral training in health service psychology. In this review, we will discuss the specialty of clinical neuropsychology separately as that specialty has a formal computerized match and therefore faces subsequent challenges that are distinct from, but in some ways mirror, the  faced broadly by health service psychology postdoctoral training programs.

...
"The current computerized matching psychology internship selection process began in 1998–1999, 10 years after an earlier trial, rejection, and reintroduction (Keilin, 2000). Prior to the introduction of computerized matching, the internship selection process relied on the “uniform notification day” (UND) system for more than 25 years. This process of internship offers and acceptances shortened from an initial offer and acceptance period of 9 days to 4 hours (Keilin, 1998). In 1988–1989, there was a trial period to evaluate the effectiveness of a computer-based algorithm match process. Although the outcomes showed a significant improvement over the UND, there was a lack of full participation by internship sites that appeared to have a detrimental impact on the outcomes observed (Keilin, 1998). Recurrent discussion within the Association of Psychology Postdoctoral and Internship Centers (APPIC) reflected gradually shifting approval, from a vote of 55% to 45% to retain the UND in 1990, to 77% approval to move to a computer-based match system by May 1998 for immediate implementation for the 1998–1999 recruitment year.
...
"There were wide-spread reports of both applicants and programs accepting less preferred choices due to the fear of not securing or filling a position within the UND window. APPIC responded by clarifying the rules with a prohibition against sites soliciting rank information (Constantine & Keilin, 1996). APPIC voted to proceed with a computer-based match process in 1998 using a match algorithm similar to the National Residency Match Program (Roth & Peranson, 1999). The computer-match system transcends difficulties on both sides by providing an equitable solution designed to provide the best possible match for all parties involved (Keilin, 1998). This solution reduces the pressure associated with short decision-making times and has the benefit of reducing the gridlock associated with UND (Roth & Xing, 1997).
...
"The computerized match has been used every year since, and it is now widely considered the optimal process for doctoral internship selection.

"The recruitment and selection process at the postdoctoral level remains in an evolutionary stage at the present time. Coordination of the psychology postdoctoral selection market is complicated by the fact that it is actually made up of multiple submarkets. Psychology interns may consider several options for their next professional experience, including an entry-level job, a research fellowship, a general clinical psychology fellowship, or a postdoctoral fellowship in a specialty practice area (e.g., neuropsychology, health psychology, clinical child psychology, or forensic psychology). Several of these submarkets have different timelines. For example, entry-level jobs and research fellowships are dependent on idiosyncratic funding streams and employment needs and, as such, may not realistically be expected to adhere to a coordinated timeline. 

...
"In 2003, there was renewed effort to establish more systemization to protect applicants from being forced into making decisions about early offers that did not reflect their true preferences. 
...
"As part of a 2009 APPIC biennial conference presentation, Lemle proposed a modified selection process with an additional feature intended to make participation more attractive to programs. The additional feature would allow applicants who received an early offer from a nonparticipating site to contact a preferred program to pledge they would accept a “reciprocal offer” should one be extended. A UND with reciprocal offer option (UNDr) assured programs that their top applicants who also wished to come to their site would not be lost to competing offers.
...
" Beginning in Fall, 2016, the APPIC postdoctoral workgroup took strides to address several proximal recommendations borne in the summit. First, the workgroup further refined the Postdoctoral Selection Guidelines (PSG) for positions starting in 2017–2018 as a step toward developing a clear and transparent system that would allow applicants sufficient time to consider offers (applicants were allowed 24 hr to consider offers) and allow programs the time needed to interview applicants. A primary aim of the PSG is to decrease the significant stress on both applicants and training directors. The PSG address multiple stages of the selection process impacting trainees including reasonable interview notification timing, consideration of remote interview formats, postponing offers until the UND, and proper use of the reciprocal offer option (UNDr).
...
"The APPIC postdoctoral workgroup also followed the summit recommendation to spearhead the development of a centralized listing of postdoctoral positions, the Universal Psychology Postdoctoral Directory (UPPD), that is free for both APPIC and non-APPIC member programs. 
...
"Clinical neuropsychology has a distinct history that is informative when considering the issues discussed in this article. Most notably, there is currently a formal computerized match for postdoctoral selection in clinical neuropsychology (Belanger et al., 2013; Bodin, Roper, O’Toole, & Haines, 2016). Prior to 1994, there was no organized process for recruitment and selection in clinical neuropsychology. 
...
"In 2001, APPCN partnered with NMS to conduct a computerized match for postdoctoral selection in clinical neuropsychology that has continued to the present day. The APPCN match employs the same algorithm used for the psychology internship match, but dissimilarities across the two recruiting environments have contributed to differences in the success of the two systems over the years. Since its inception, the internship match has enjoyed virtually universal participation by programs. Importantly, the APPCN match was introduced without a clear understanding of the total universe of positions being offered by neuropsychology postdoctoral programs, and those outside of APPCN were not a part of an organized group interested in centralized recruitment. Years later, Belanger et al. (2013) estimated that roughly two thirds of available positions were offered in the APPCN match. Withdrawal rates for applicants initially registering for the APPCN match have ranged from 26% to 37% over the past 10 years and have been stable from 34 and 36% for the last five years. Although some applicants withdraw for personal reasons, the most common reason has been to accept offers from independent programs prior to the rank-order list (ROL) deadline for the APPCN match.