Monday, January 5, 2015

Ramesh Johari's course on Platform and Marketplace Design, starts tomorrow

Take the class, or you can also scroll down and see the syllabus with links to the papers.

MS&E 336: Platform and Marketplace Design

Course time

Tuesdays and Thursdays, 10:00-11:50 AM

Instructors

Ramesh Johari
Associate Professor
Management Science and Engineering
Electrical Engineering (by courtesy)
Huang Engineering Center, Room 311
E-mail: ramesh.johari@stanford.edu
Office hours: TBA, Huang 311
Additional office hours by appointment


Nick Arnosti (TA)
Management Science and Engineering
E-mail}: narnosti@stanford.edu
Office hours: TBA

Course website

The course website will be accessible through CourseWork.

Catalog course description

The last decade has witnessed a meteoric rise in the number of online markets and platforms competing with traditional mechanisms of trade. Examples of such markets include online marketplaces for goods, such as eBay; online dating markets; markets for shared resources, such as Lyft, Uber, and Airbnb; and online labor markets. We will review recent research that aims to both understand and design such markets. Emphasis on mathematical modeling and methodology, with a view towards preparing Ph.D. students for research in this area.

Detailed course description

Markets are an ancient institution for matching the supply for a good or service with its demand. Physical markets were typically slow to evolve, with simple institutions governing trade, and trading partners generally facing a daunting challenge in finding the “right” partner. The information technology revolution, however, has generated a sea of change in how markets function: now, markets are typically complex platforms, with a range of mechanisms involved in facilitating matches among participants.  Recent trends point to an unprecedented level of control over the design, implementation, and operation of markets: more than ever before, we are able to engineer the platforms governing transactions among market participants.  As a consequence, market operators or platforms can control a host of variables such as pricing, liquidity, visibility, information revelation, terms of trade, and transaction fees. The decisions made by the platform and the market participants interact, sometimes in intricate and subtle ways, to determine market outcomes.


This course is intended to prepare students for research on online and platform markets.  The course was inspired by the following observation: in the last decade, a wide range of graduates with quantitative backgrounds have been put into positions where they are effectively designing markets every day.  Often this is a side effect of being thrust into a software engineering, product development, or regulatory role: for example, a new hire might be asked to change how users browse through search results on eBay or Airbnb.  As is immediately apparent to a market designer, small changes to that basic infrastructure---the search engine---can radically alter the behavior of the market itself.  The goal in the class is to prepare students to be able to think conceptually about these market design challenges.


With that motivation in mind, we have three main goals for the quarter:
  1. Problems.  The first goal is to use the quarter to identify open research directions that have risen to the forefront with the rise of online platforms.  We live in an exciting time for market design, with great interest in the fundamentals, as well as a rich set of applications that motivate research directions, and provide data and testbeds for validation.  A key emphasis in this part of the class is to focus on “levers” that affect the information that market participants obtain about each other in a variety of ways.
  2. Tools. The second goal is to ensure students have access to a basic set of tools with which to reason about such markets.  The course assumes students have already had prior exposure to game theory and economic modeling.  In this course, we will focus on a set of tools that have specifically proven helpful in studying platform markets, and the effects of design interventions on these markets.  A key emphasis is on large market models.
  3. Applications.  Along the way, we hope to learn about how the research questions we identify and the tools we learn are relevant to specific marketplaces.  This will be through a mix of mathematical modeling, empirical research, as well as anecdotal evidence.


The course will be taught using a mix of lecture format and seminar-style guided discussion. Much of what we will discuss is active research, so the reading material will be drawn from relevant papers in the literature; this material will be available from the course website. The focus will be on encouraging discussion of both open theoretical questions and modeling issues. This is particularly important since the course content draws from a range of disciplines (operations research, computer science, economics, etc.). The course should provide a unique forum for a lively exchange of ideas across these boundaries.

Evaluation

Your grade in the course will be based on two components.
  1. Participation in lecture [ 40% of course grade ]. You will be expected to read papers and actively participate in lectures.  To help make sure this happens, for at least four of the weeks of the quarter, you will have to choose one paper that you need to read and prepare a “mini-review”.  The mini-review consists of answers to the following three questions, in 100 words or less each:
    1. What is the paper about?
    2. What are the strengths of the paper?
    3. What are the weaknesses of the paper?
Each mini-review will be graded credit/no-credit, i.e., you will receive full credit for this
component if you satisfactorily complete each mini-review.
  1. Course project [ 60% of course grade ]. A course project is the main evaluation component of the class.  The course project is meant to get you thinking actively about research problems in the market design problems represented by the course material.  The project will culminate in a presentation to your fellow students, and a written report (due by March 20, 2015).
    I will distribute more details on the project in the first week of lecture.

Course outline



Note: The content described on the course outline below will take up the first 14 lectures of the quarter.  (This is why each lecture is 110 minutes, instead of the usual 75 minutes.)  The remainder of the quarter will be used for guest speakers and discussion and presentation of course projects.


Part 1 (2 lectures): Introduction to platforms

We introduce platforms, and cover some of the relevant economics literature that defines and analyzes two-sided platforms.


Topics of interest:
  1. What is a (two-sided) platform?
  2. What is the objective of the platform operator,
    what information does she possess, and
    what tools does she have to acheive these objectives?
  3. What are the objectives of platform participants,
    what information do they possess,
    and what actions are available to them?


Papers:


Part 2 (2 lectures): Operational details of platforms -- pricing

We consider what the introductory papers might have missed, focusing on pricing strategies.  The emphasis is on operational details of platform behavior.


Topics of interest:
  1. Pricing usage
    1. Membership fees and subscriptions
    2. Usage-based fee with flat fee per transaction/match
    3. Usage-based fee with volume-based fee per transaction/match
  2. Pricing visibility: paying for preferential access to the other side of the market
  3. Pricing transaction risk: paying for reduced uncertainty of trade


Papers:


Part 3 (3 lectures): Operational details of platforms -- reputation and feedback

We study the role of reputation systems used by online platforms to help participants judge trading partners they have never met.


Topics of interest:
  1. Examples of reputation and feedback systems
  2. What incentives do particular systems provide to market participants?
  3. How do we design systems that incentivize honest feedback?
  4. How should the platform use the feedback system as a “lever” to improve market performance?


Papers:
  1. Horton and Golden, Reputation Inflation in an Online Market


Part 4 (3 lectures): Operational details of platforms -- search

We discuss how the platform can mediate matches by directing the search effort of each side of the market.


Topics of interest:
  1. How do market participants cope with the search frictions of finding trading partners?
  2. What information should the platform share with market participants about potential matches?
  3. What mechanisms can the platform provide to participants to improve the signals they send each other?


Papers:
  1. Horton and Johari, At What Quality and What Price? Inducing Separating Equilibria as a Market Design Problem


Part 5 (4 lectures): Modeling tools

In this part of the course we will cover some tools that have proven helpful in modeling and analyzing operational aspects of two-sided platforms.  We emphasize the use of large market models.


Topics of interest:
  1. Large market models of static markets
    1. Directed search and decentralized matching
    2. Double auctions
  2. Large market models of dynamic markets
    1. Repeated (dynamic) auctions
    2. Dynamic matching models


Papers of interest:

  1. Arnosti, Johari, and Kanoria, Managing Congestion in Dynamic Matching Markets

Blood donation, in China

Here's a paper on incentivizing blood donation, with data from China.

Solving Shortage in a Priceless Market: Insights from Blood Donation
by Tianshu Sun, Susan Feng Lu, and Ginger Zhe Jin
November 2014

Abstract:
Blood shortage is common in many countries but it cannot be solved by price adjustment given the WHO recommendation for 100% unpaid voluntary donation. In this paper, we evaluate two non-price methods that blood banks often use to address shortage. The first method is informing existing donors of the current shortage via mobile message and encouraging them to donate voluntarily. The second method is asking the patient’s family or friends to donate in a family replacement program. Using 472,342 individual donation records from a large Chinese blood bank, we show that both methods are effective in addressing blood shortage in the short run but the two methods target different audiences and therefore have different implications for total blood supply. 


In the conclusion, the authors note that shortage messages reach existing donors, while family replacement programs primarily draw in new donors.

"Overall, the back-of-envelope calculation suggests that shortage message can be used in places
where the donor population is large and the shortage is small. In comparison, FR could be more
useful when the donor population is small and the shortage is severe. In this sense, our data suggests a more optimistic picture for FR than the WHO recommendation. However, in a society with a low donation rate (which could be the reason for severe shortage to begin with), most FR donors will be no-history FR donors and the FR treatment may discourage voluntary donation in
the long run by generating either distrust or crowd-out. Although a broader introduction of FR
can bring more blood supply in the short run, it may exacerbate shortage problem in the long run.
Like the WHO, we reach a cautionary conclusion for the FR program but for a reason different
from quality concerns. "



Sunday, January 4, 2015

Can high pay be coercive and repugnant?

Sandro Ambuehl* will be presenting this paper at the AEA meetngs today:

More Money, More Problems? Can High Pay be Coercive and Repugnant?
By SANDRO AMBUEHL, MURIEL NIEDERLE, AND ALVIN E. ROTH

"Sometimes two people would voluntarily agree to transact a good or service for compensation, but an unaffected third party would prefer to prevent this transaction. Paid kidney donation, surrogate motherhood, prostitution, and paid participation in medical trials are examples.  We use a vignette study to explore how respondents' assessments of such repugnant transactions change as we alter the seller's compensation. We then sketch a model of how people judge the morality of such transactions."


*You'll have to wait until next year to hire him.

Saturday, January 3, 2015

Market design at the AEA meetings in Boston

Here are some market-design-related sessions that caught my eye on first glance through the big program. (Three of them are at the same time:)

Jan 03, 2015 8:00 am, Hynes Convention Center, Room 209 
American Economic Association
Empirical Market Design (D4)
PresidingRAMESH JOHARI (Stanford University)
Quality Externalities and the Limits of Reputation in Two-Sided Markets
CHRIS NOSKO (University of Chicago)
STEVEN TADELIS (University of California-Berkeley)
[View Abstract]
At What Quality and What Price? Inducing Separating Equilibria as a Market Design Problem
JOHN JOSEPH HORTON (New York University)
RAMESH JOHARI (Stanford University)
[View Abstract]
Changing the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton
ERIC BUDISH (University of Chicago)
JUDD KESSLER (University of Pennsylvania)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
The Economics of the Common Application
CHRISTOPHER AVERY (Harvard University)
PARAG A. PATHAK (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
[View Abstract]
Discussants:
ALI HORTACSU (University of Chicago)
STEVEN TADELIS (University of California-Berkeley)
EDUARDO AZEVEDO (University of Pennsylvania)
ERIC BUDISH (University of Chicago)

******

Jan 03, 2015 2:30 pm, Sheraton Boston, Beacon E 
Econometric Society

Empirical Analyses of Selling Mechanisms in Dynamic Environments (D4)

PresidingGLENN ELLISON (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
An Empirical Analysis of Informationally Restricted Dynamic Auctions of Used Cars
SUNGJIN CHO (Seoul National University)
HARRY JOHN PAARSCH (Amazon)
JOHN RUST (Georgetown University)
[View Abstract]
Invest in Information or Wing It? A Model of Dynamic Pricing with Seller Learning
GUOFANG HUANG (Carnegie Mellon University)
HONG LUO (Harvard Business School)
JING XIA (Harvard University)
[View Abstract]
Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of "Bob the Broker"
ERIC BUDISH (University of Chicago)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Discussants:
JAKUB KASTL (Stanford University)
BRADLEY LARSEN (Stanford University)
GLENN ELLISON (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
*********

Jan 04, 2015 8:00 am, Hynes Convention Center, Room 206 
American Economic Association

Electronic Commerce and Big Data (L8, M2)

PresidingJUSTIN RAO (Microsoft Research)
Sales Taxes Shielding on the Amazon.com Platform
ALEJANDRO MOLNAR (Vanderbilt University)
PAULO SOMAINI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
[View Abstract]
Salience and Quality Choice
BRADLEY LARSEN (Stanford University )
DOMINIC COEY (eBay Research Labs)
KANE SWEENEY (eBay Research Labs)
[View Abstract]
Do-Not-Track and the Economics of Third-Party Advertising
GIORGOS ZERVAS (Boston University)
JUSTIN RAO (Microsoft Research)
SHARAD GOEL (Microsoft Research)
CEREN BUDAK (Microsoft Research)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Big Data to the Rescue? Machine Learning and Causal Inference in Online Advertising
RANDALL LEWIS (Google, Inc.)
MICHAEL HANKIN (University of Southern California)
[View Abstract]
Discussants:
DAVID REILEY (Google, Inc.)
MICHAEL OSTROVSKY (Stanford University)
STEVEN TADELIS (University of California-Berkeley and eBay Research Labs)
DENIS NEKIPELOV (University of California-Berkeley)
************

Jan 04, 2015 10:15 am, Sheraton Boston, Commonwealth 
American Economic Association

Moral Values and Economic Behavior (A1, Z1)

PresidingALVIN E. ROTH (Stanford University)
Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy of Science, Religion, and Growth
ROLAND BENABOU (Princeton University)
DAVIDE TICCHI (Institute for Advanced Studies-Lucca)
ANDREA VINDIGNI (Institute for Advanced Studies-Lucca)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Combating Vote-Selling: A Field Experiment in the Philippines
ALLEN HICKEN (University of Michigan)
STEPHEN LEIDER (University of Michigan)
NICO RAVANILLA (University of Michigan)
DEAN YANG (University of Michigan)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
More Money, More Problems? Can High Pay Be Coercive And Repugnant?
SANDRO AMBUEHL (Stanford University)
MURIEL NIEDERLE (Stanford University)
ALVIN E. ROTH (Stanford University)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Are Attitudes about Morally Controversial Transactions Affected by Information? The Case of Payments for Human Organs
JULIO J. ELIAS (Universidad del CEMA)
NICOLA LACETERA (University of Toronto)
MARIO MACIS (Johns Hopkins University)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Discussants:
ANDREI SHLEIFER (Harvard University)
JUDD KESSLER (University of Pennsylvania)
THEODORE BERGSTROM (University of California-Santa Barbara)
RODNEY GARRATT (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
**********

Jan 04, 2015 10:15 am, Boston Marriott Copley, Vermont 
Economic Science Association

Political Engineering (D7, D6)

PresidingT. NICOLAUS TIDEMAN (Virginia Tech)
Quadratic Voting
STEVEN P. LALLEY (University of Chicago)
E. GLEN WEYL (Microsoft Research New England)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Aggregating Local Preferences To Guide Policy
DANIEL BENJAMIN (Cornell University)
GABRIEL CARROLL (Stanford University)
ORI HEFFETZ (Cornell University)
MILES KIMBALL (University of Michigan)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Storable Votes and Judicial Nominations in the United States Senate.
ALESSANDRA CASELLA (Columbia University)
SEBASTIEN TURBAN (California Institute of Tecnology)
GREGORY WAWRO (Columbia University)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Purchasing Votes without Cash: Implementing Quadratic Voting Outside the Lab
ROMAN DAVID ZARATE (University of California-Berkeley)
CESAR MANTILLA (Toulouse School of Economics)
JUAN CAMILO CÁRDENAS (Universidad de los Andes)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Discussants:
ERIC S. MASKIN (Harvard University)
RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER (Harvard University)
JOHN MORGAN (University of California-Berkeley)
ERIK SNOWBERG (California Institute of Technology)
**********

Jan 04, 2015 10:15 am, Boston Marriott Copley, Simmons 
Industrial Organization Society

Frontiers of Empirical Industrial Organization (L1)

PresidingMARC RYSMAN (Boston University)
Drip Pricing When Consumers Have Limited Foresight: Evidence from Driving School Fees
DAVID MUIR (University of Pennsylvania)
KATJA SEIM (University of Pennsylvania)
MARIA ANA VITORINO (University of Minnesota)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
The Welfare Effects of Congestion in Uncoordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match
ATILA ABDULKADIROGLU (Duke University)
NIKHIL AGARWAL (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
PARAG A. PATHAK (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
[View Abstract]
Deposit Competition and Financial Fragility: Evidence from the United States Banking Sector
MARK EGAN (University of Chicago)
ALI HORTACSU (University of Chicago)
GREGOR MATVOS (University of Chicago)
[View Abstract]
Information Frictions and the Welfare Consequences of Adverse Selection
BENJAMIN HANDEL (University of California-Berkeley)
JONATHAN KOLSTAD (University of Pennsylvania)
JOHANNES SPINNEWIJN (London School of Economics)
Discussants:
CHRIS CONLON (Columbia University)
FRANCESCO DECAROLIS (Boston University)
GINGER ZHE JIN (University of Maryland)
DAN ACKERBERG (University of Michigan)
******

Jan 04, 2015 12:30 pm, Sheraton Boston, Riverway 
Korea-America Economic Association/American Economic Association

The Economics of the Internet (L8, D8)

PresidingJAY PIL CHOI (University New South Wales and Michigan State University)
Social Media and News Consumption
SUSAN ATHEY (Stanford University)
MARKUS MOBIUS (Microsoft Research)
JENO PAL (Central European University)
[View Abstract]
Net Neutrality, Business Models, and Internet Interconnection
JAY PIL CHOI (University New South Wales and Michigan State University)
DOH-SHIN JEON (Toulouse School of Economics)
BYUNG-CHEOL KIM (Georgia Institute of Technology)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Match Quality, Search, and the Internet Market for Used Books
GLENN ELLISON (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
SARA ELLISON (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
[View Abstract]
An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Online Search
THOMAS BLAKE (eBay Research Labs)
CHRIS NOSKO (University of Chicago)
STEVEN TADELIS (University of California-Berkeley)
[View Abstract]
Discussants:
KYOO IL KIM (Michigan State University)
JOSHUA GANS (University of Toronto)
MINJAE SONG (Bates White)
YUN JEONG CHOI (Yonsei University)
*******

Jan 04, 2015 2:30 pm, Hynes Convention Center, Room 204 
American Economic Association

Recent Advances in the Analysis of Auction Data (L1, D4)

PresidingKEN HENDRICKS (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
The Bidder Exclusion Effect
DOMINIC COEY (eBay Research Labs)
BRADLEY LARSEN (Stanford University)
KANE SWEENEY (eBay Research Labs)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Collusion and Reciprocity in First-Price Procurements
PAULO SOMAINI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
[View Abstract]
Simultaneous First-Price Auctions with Preferences over Combinations
MATTHEW GENTRY (London School of Economics)
TATIANA KOMAROVA (London School of Economics)
PASQUALE SCHIRALDI (London School of Economics)
[View Abstract]
A Simple Test for Moment Inequality Models with an Application to English Auctions
ANDRES ARADILLAS-LOPEZ (Pennsylvania State University)
AMIT GANDHI (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
DANIEL QUINT (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Discussants:
TATIANA KOMAROVA (London School of Economics)
SERAFIN GRUNDL (Federal Reserve Board)
PAULO SOMAINI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
ALEJANDRO MOLNAR (Vanderbilt University)
***********

an 04, 2015 2:30 pm, Sheraton Boston, Beacon F 
Econometric Society

Advances in Collusion and Antitrust Policy (K2, L4)

PresidingJUDITH CHEVALIER (Yale University)
Co-Opetition: Some Antitrust of Arrangements Between Competitors
JEAN TIROLE (Toulouse School of Economics)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Effects of Antitrust Leniency on Concealment Effort by Colluding Firms
LESLIE MARX (Duke University)
CLAUDIO MEZZETTI (University of Melbourne)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Cooperation, R&D Spillovers and Antitrust Policy
ANGEL LOPEZ (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
XAVIER VIVES (IESE Business School)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Discussants:
BARRY NALEBUFF (Yale University)
JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON (University of Pennsylvania)
LUIS CABRAL (New York University)
*******

Jan 05, 2015 8:00 am, Sheraton Boston, Constitution Ballroom B 
American Economic Association

Patent Economics (K2, O3)

PresidingJOSHUA LERNER (Harvard University)
Standard-Essential Patents
JOSHUA LERNER (Harvard University)
JEAN TIROLE (Toulouse School of Economics)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials
ERIC BUDISH (University of Chicago)
BENJAMIN ROIN (Harvard University)
HEIDI WILLIAMS (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Innovation: Evidence from TRIPS
MARGARET KYLE (Toulouse School of Economics)
YI QIAN (Northwestern University)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Discussants:
UFUK AKCIGIT (University of Pennsylvania)
PETRA MOSER (Stanford University)
PIERRE AZOULAY (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
LOUIS KAPLOW (Harvard University)
*******

Jan 05, 2015 8:00 am, Sheraton Boston, Beacon G 
Econometric Society

Theory of Matching Markets (C1)

PresidingRAMESH JOHARI (Stanford University)
Stable Matching in Large Economies
YEON-KOO CHE (Columbia University)
JINWOO KIM (Seoul National University)
FUHITO KOJIMA (Stanford University)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets
YEON-KOO CHE (Columbia University)
OLIVIER TERCIEUX (Paris School of Economics)
[View Abstract]
Managing Congestion in Dynamic Matching Markets
NICK ARNOSTI (Stanford University)
RAMESH JOHARI (Stanford University)
YASH KANORIA (Columbia University)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Matching with Peers in School Choice
ATILA ABDULKADIROGLU (Duke University)
[View Abstract]
Discussants:
PARAG A. PATHAK (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
ITAI ASHLAGI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
JOHN JOSEPH HORTON (New York University)
JACOB LESHNO (Columbia University)
*******


Friday, January 2, 2015

The effect of charter schools in New Orleans and Boston: Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, Hull and Pathak

Two of the pioneers of market design for school choice, Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Parag Pathak, have teamed up with colleagues to analyse the effects of charter schools, using data from the school choice programs they helped design in Boston and New Orleans.


CHARTERS WITHOUT LOTTERIES: TESTING TAKEOVERS IN NEW ORLEANS AND BOSTON
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Joshua D. Angrist, Peter D. Hull, and Parag A. Pathak
Working Paper 20792
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20792

ABSTRACT
Lottery estimates suggest oversubscribed urban charter schools boost student achievement markedly. But these estimates needn’t capture treatment effects for students who haven’t applied to charter schools or for students attending charters for which demand is weak. This paper reports estimates of the effect of charter school attendance on middle-schoolers in charter takeovers in New Orleans and Boston. Takeovers are traditional public schools that close and then re-open as charter schools. Students enrolled in the schools designated for closure are eligible for “grandfathering” into the new schools; that is, they are guaranteed seats. We use this fact to construct instrumental variables estimates of the effects of passive charter attendance: the grandfathering instrument compares students at schools designated for takeover with students who appear similar at baseline and who were attending similar schools not yet closed, while adjusting for possible violations of the exclusion restriction in such comparisons. Estimates for a large sample of takeover schools in the New Orleans Recovery School District show substantial gains from takeover enrollment. In Boston, where we can compare grandfathering and lottery estimates for a middle school, grandfathered students see achievement gains at least as large as the gains for students assigned seats in lotteries. Larger reading gains for grandfathering compliers are explained by a worse non-charter fallback.
*************

School choice in New Orleans is one of the design projects undertaken by the Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice (IIPSC).

The design of Boston's school choice system predated IIPSC; here's an early paper on that: The Boston Public School Match.

Thursday, January 1, 2015

Black Market Kidney Broker Is Released From Prison


Black Market Kidney Broker Is Released From Prison

"A man who prosecutors said styled himself as 'the Robin Hood of kidneys" is out of prison after being the first person convicted in federal court of profiting from the illegal sale of human organs.

"Levy Izhak Rosenbaum, an Israeli citizen, won't be deported because federal immigration officials found that his crime was not one of "moral turpitude" that would have subjected him to being kicked out of the U.S., lawyer Edward Schulman said.

"It illustrates the intersection between legality and morality," Shulman said.

"Rosenbaum, now 63, was arrested in 2009 in what became the biggest corruption case ever in New Jersey. He had been living legally in the U.S.

"He pleaded guilty to illegally selling human organs in 2011 and served more than two years in prison.

"He was released this week from the federal correctional facility at New Jersey's Fort Dix, and Shulman said he has returned to his home in New York City's Brooklyn borough.

"Shulman said immigration officials decided not to send the case to a court to sort out because it was clear Rosenbaum's offense was not a deportable crime.

"Rosenbaum pleaded guilty to brokering the sale of three kidneys ? buying them from people in Israel for as little as $10,000, then selling them to U.S. patients who did not qualify for transplants or did not want to wait. The cost of the sale was over $100,000, and the operations were performed at top U.S. hospitals.

"While he pleaded guilty to three counts, authorities said he brokered many more kidney transplants and made millions from the deals.

"If he was drugging the people or knocking them out" to get their kidneys, Shulman said, that would have been a deportable offense. But, he said, that was not the case. "Both participants were willing."

"Shulman said his client's deals saved lives.

"One could contend that letting somebody die," Shulman said, "is also immoral."