tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4748060798655400108.post4993713342702698535..comments2023-11-02T08:55:35.510-07:00Comments on Market Design: Illegal cartels and the prisoner's dilemmaAl Rothhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02232854038397912604noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4748060798655400108.post-10803855484006559762011-10-25T06:54:18.584-07:002011-10-25T06:54:18.584-07:00INteresting information, it shows that many of us ...INteresting information, it shows that many of us are clueless with a lot of things happening in the world.safe medshttp://www.safemedspharmacy.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4748060798655400108.post-82561646756702735522008-12-13T21:07:00.000-08:002008-12-13T21:07:00.000-08:00You argue that the design of anti-cartel laws caus...You argue that the design of anti-cartel laws caused the quick collapse of the paraffin cartel. The timing of events described in the NYT article do provide some evidence. The possibility to bargain a smaller fine for offenders who turn in early in the process seems to be key. Do you know when this law was passed?<BR/><BR/>This is indeed a typical case of a prisoners' dilemma. On similar grounds, cartels are usually short-lived because the cooperative equilibrium is unstable. Yet, the paraffin cartel lasted several decades. Further, when suspicious customers started to look for providers outside Europe, those quickly aligned their pricing more or less on cartel prices. This begs the question : how do you explain such a lack of appetite on behalf of competitors?<BR/><BR/>Is it far-stretched to imagine that some other law was instrumental in making the cartel stable until 2005, thus enabling it to last so long?Gu Si Fanghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07169265392435046251noreply@blogger.com