tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4748060798655400108.post2185117889525215832..comments2023-11-02T08:55:35.510-07:00Comments on Market Design: Do organ donors have a right to donate?Al Rothhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02232854038397912604noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4748060798655400108.post-46644695251546960892018-01-10T13:28:25.183-08:002018-01-10T13:28:25.183-08:00Hi Alvin,
I just listened to a rebroadcasted inte...Hi Alvin,<br /><br />I just listened to a rebroadcasted interview of you on Freakconomics.<br /><br />I too enjoy market design; So here goes;<br /><br />From the podcast, I inducted the following;<br /><br />1) There is a great need for kidney donation<br />2) There is an even higher need for kidney classification, as not every kidney is a match<br />3) There is a high surplus of kidneys in any given population<br />4) The larger the population, the higher the likelihood that an unused kidney exists when a need arises<br />5).Donors take on some risk/cost as a result of donation. As they lose their redundant kidney<br />6) Much of the motivation for donors currently centers around asterism, (say for a loved one)<br />7) Current kidney exchange, relies heavily on temporal coincidence, in that not only do kidneys need to be matched, but timing needs to match too<br />8) Delays in finding matches, increase the overall health cost of the population<br /><br />From there, rightly or wrongly, I deduced the following;<br /><br />1) For most people that need a donation, there probably exists at least one match to a surplus kidney in the population<br />2) There is an information problem in identifying all of the potential matches in a given population<br />3) Many potential donors value personal risk mitigation and perceived reciprocity<br />4) People trust the 3rd party escrow system in place<br />5) Speeding up donations would decrease the overall cost of the need for donation<br /><br />And from there I drew the following design assumptions;<br /><br /><br />Transactions would increase by;<br />1) Adding risk mitigation as a motivator for donors <br />2) Removing the temporal requirement as a prerequisite to matching <br />3) Incentivising testing<br />4) Incentivising donation<br />5) designing a system that increases reciprocity <br /><br />Market Design; tokenized privileges exchanged through an escrow system.<br /><br /><br />Two tokens;<br />- Token B: earned when a potential donor is tested for kidney classification. Time stamped when created.<br />- Token A: earned when donor donates a kidney to needed recipient.<br />- Tokens are held in escrow system.<br />- Potential donors earn Token B, upon testing. And a separate Token A upon donation, thus earning 2 tokens for one donation.<br />- Potential donors (token B holders), and donors (token A holders) may transfer their tokens to a family member, or friend in need for donation, through the escrow system.<br /><br />Tokenized Exchange;<br /><br />When a new kidney becomes available; a list of potential recipients is generated.<br /> <br />Priory is given in the following order;<br />1) Token A holders first, with the timestamp of the token deciding when more than 1 token A holder is a match<br />2) Token B holders second, with the timestamp of the token deciding when more than 1 token B holder is a match<br />3) non-token holders<br /><br />Expected results;<br />1) Tokens allow exchanges to happen without direct matching<br /><br />2) Potential Donors can greatly decrease their risk of not having a kidney available when they need it by just getting tested. The sooner the testing, the higher the timestamp priority at time of need<br /><br />3) Donors can further decrease their own personal risk (of not having a kidney when needed) by donating a surplus kidney, thus receiving one token A and one token B in the process. The sooner the donation, the higher their timestamp priority at time of need<br /><br />4) Tokens resolve the temporal match requirement, while maintaining high levels of reciprocity<br /><br />5) Existing escrow system maintains trust in the market<br /><br />So at it’s core, a donor gets one token B and one token A in return for their single kidney. And the timestamp priority gives the needed incentive (increased value) to encourage quicker action. Two high priorities, (one token B and one token A) in return for one donation then maintains reciprocity and risk mitigation desires that the donor has.<br /><br />I could go on, but I think you get the idea....<br /><br />And back to this article, the donation of two kidneys, would result in the creation of one B token, plus an additional A token for each successful donation. And these timestamped tokens could be assigned to the trustee of choice through the escrow system.<br /><br />Best,<br />BrucePrior_Analyticshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12779352118309295316noreply@blogger.com