Sunday, June 30, 2013

Open software as a way to find programmers

The NY Times has an article that focuses on the company Gild and how they go headhunting among the reputational rankings on coder sites: How Big Data Is Playing Recruiter for Specialized Workers

"Gild is not the only company now scouring for information. TalentBin, another San Francisco start-up firm, searches the Internet for talented programmers, trawling sites where they gather, collecting “data exhaust,” according to the company Web site, and creating lists of potential hires for employers. Another competitor is RemarkableHire, which assesses a person’s talents by looking at how his or her online contributions are rated by others.

"And there’s Entelo, which tries to figure out who might be looking for a job before they even start their exploration. According to its Web site, the company uses more than 70 variables to find indications of possible career change, such as how someone presents herself on social sites. The Web site reads: “We crunch the data so you don’t have to.”

Saturday, June 29, 2013

Algorithmics Of Matching Under Preferences by David Manlove

A new book on matching, from a computer science perspective:

Algorithmics Of Matching Under Preferences

Manlove, D. (2013) Algorithmics Of Matching Under Preferences. Series: Theoretical Computer Science . World Scientific Publishing. ISBN 9789814425247


A new book by Dr David Manlove of the School of Computing Science has recently been published by World Scientific as part of their Series on Theoretical Computer Science. This book, called “Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences”, deals with algorithms and complexity issues surrounding the matching of agents to one another when preferences are involved. For example, in several countries, centralised matching schemes handle the annual allocation of intending junior doctors to hospitals based on their preferences over one another. Efficient algorithms required to solve the underlying theoretical matching problems. Similar examples arise in the allocation of pupils to schools, students to projects, kidney patients to donors, and so on. The book surveys algorithmic results for a range of matching problems involving preferences, with practical applications areas including those mentioned above. It covers the classical Stable Marriage, Hospitals/Residents and Stable Roommates problems, where so-called stable matchings are sought, thereby providing an update to “The Stable Marriage problem, Structure and Algorithms”, by Dan Gusfield and Rob Irving, published by MIT Press in 1989. It also extends the coverage to the House Allocation problem, where stability is no longer the key requirement for a matching, and other definitions of optimality hold. This book builds on the author’s prior research in this area, and also his practical experience of developing, with colleagues including Rob Irving and Gregg O’Malley, algorithms for matching kidney patients to donors in the UK (collaborating with NHS Blood and Transplant), for assigning medical students to hospitals in Scotland (in collaboration with NHS Education for Scotland), and for allocating students to elective courses and projects (within the Schools of Medicine and Computing Science at the University of Glasgow, respectively). The book is also timely, as the research area recently came to the forefront in 2012 following the award of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences to Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley, two leading contributors to the field of matching theory and its application in practical settings, whose work is described in detail throughout the book. A Foreword is contributed by Kurt Mehlhorn of Max-Planck Institut fur Informatik, Saarbrucken, who wrote: “This book covers the research area in its full breadth and beauty. Written by one of the foremost experts in the area, it is a timely update to “The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms” (D. Gusfield and R.W. Irving, 1989). This book will be required reading for anybody working on the subject; it has a good chance of becoming a classic.”

Friday, June 28, 2013

Chinese auctions of auto registrations, and the market for cars in China

To keep down congestion in big cities, Chinese authorities limit who can drive, either by lottery or by auction.  Here's a story suggesting that the high price of driving drives inexpensive cars out of the market:
In China, the license plates can cost more than the car

"Shanghai’s busy streets teem with Buicks, Fords, Volkswagens, and Toyotas. More than 9 out of 10 cars in the world’s most populous city are made by foreign companies, and it’s not just a reflection of mainlanders’ preference for Western design. Some local automakers say the city’s license plate auctions are responsible for their weak sales. Shanghai is one of four Chinese cities that limit car purchases by imposing quotas on registrations. The prices paid at Shanghai’s license auctions in recent months—90,000 yuan ($14,530)—have exceeded the cost of many entry-level cars, the stronghold of Chinese brands such as Chery, Geely, and Great Wall. While residents with modest incomes may be able to afford an inexpensive car, the registration cost is often beyond their reach. “Whenever there’s a restriction of new car purchases through the quota system, there is always a big impact on lower-price cars like the ones we make,” says Lawrence Ang, executive director of Geely Automobile Holdings (175), whose Panda minicar sells for 37,800 yuan.

"After Beijing (pop. 21 million) introduced a license plate lottery in January 2011, the combined share of Chinese brands sold there plunged by more than half, to 9.7 percent for the year, according to researcher IHS Automotive. In Shanghai, which began auctioning license plates in 1994, domestic brands made up only 8.9 percent of cars sold in 2011 (the most recent data available), less than a third the level nationwide, IHS reports."

Thursday, June 27, 2013

Another long kidney chain: 56 people, 28 transplants

Non-simultaneous chains started by non-directed donors have assumed a large role in American kidney exchange for a number of reasons (on which, see e.g. here, and here...). The average chain isn't too long (about 5 or 6 in some of the exchanges with which Itai Ashlagi and I have been working lately), but the longest chains can be quite long. Here are some reports (a press release, another press release, and a news story) of one of those, organized by the National Kidney Registry, which included 56 people (28 donors and 28 recipients).

Here's an excerpt from the U. Penn release:

"Earlier this month, the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania and the National Kidney Registry, in partnership with 18 transplant centers across the country, successfully completed the second largest kidney exchange in history and the largest to be concluded in under 40 days. Dubbed Chain 221, the swap involved 56 participants (28 donors and 28 recipients).  "

Wednesday, June 26, 2013

Deceased organ donation by xkcd

UNOS approves new deceased donor allocation rules

OPTN/UNOS Board approves significant revisions to deceased donor kidney allocation policy

Richmond, Va. - The OPTN/UNOS Board of Directors, meeting June 24 and 25, approved substantial amendments to OPTN policy for deceased donor kidney allocation. The policy will maintain access to kidney transplantation for all groups of candidates while seeking to improve outcomes for kidney transplant recipients, increase the years recipients may have a functioning transplant and increase utilization of available kidneys. The implementation date of the policy was not immediately established but is expected to occur in 2014.
"These changes will result in better long-term kidney survival and more balanced waiting times for transplant candidates," said OPTN/UNOS President John Roberts, M.D.
Matching to increase benefit and utilization
More than 96,000 people are currently listed for kidney transplantation nationwide. About 10 percent of kidney candidates die each year while waiting. Because there are not enough kidneys donated to meet the need, it is important to improve benefit by matching recipients according to the potential function of the kidney and ensure as many kidneys as possible are transplanted.
The newly approved policy includes new factors not used in the current policy. Their use is recommended to enhance survival benefit and use of available kidneys.
Existing policy definitions of "standard criteria" and "extended criteria" donors will be replaced with the Kidney Donor Profile Index (KDPI), a clinical formula that classifies donor kidneys based upon how long they are likely to function once transplanted. Kidney transplant professionals already have access to this index as an informational resource.
The policy will also include a clinical formula to estimate the number of years each specific candidate on the waiting list would be likely to benefit from a kidney transplant. This score is called the Estimated Post-transplant Survival formula (EPTS).
Under the new policy, when a kidney donor is entered into the matching system, that individual donor's KDPI score will be considered along with the individual EPTS for compatible candidates. "A limited number of kidneys expected to function the very longest will be considered first for the candidates expected to need them for the longest amount of time," said John Friedewald, M.D., chairman of the OPTN/UNOS Kidney Transplantation Committee.
The policy is expected to increase overall "life-years" (time that recipients retain kidney function after the transplant). It may also reduce recipients' future need for repeat transplants, thus allowing more transplants among candidates awaiting their first opportunity.
The kidney matching process would not change for the majority of kidney transplant candidates unless they receive additional priority based on other considerations addressed below.
Promoting greater utilization
The 15 percent of kidney offers estimated to have the shortest potential length of function based on KDPI score will be offered on a wider geographic basis. Transplant programs may be most likely to consider these offers for candidates who would have a better life expectancy with a timely transplant than they would remaining on dialysis. This feature is expected to increase utilization of donated kidneys currently available for transplant. It may also help minimize differences in local transplant waiting times across different regions of the country.
The policy does not affect the decision-making process between an individual candidate and his or her transplant team regarding kidney offers they would be willing to accept for a transplant. The use of KDPI will provide the candidate and transplant team a clearer understanding of the potential function of the kidney to allow for more informed treatment decisions.
Waiting time calculation
As in the current kidney allocation system, the longer a candidate has waited for a transplant, the more priority he or she will have compared to others who have waited less time.
The current national default policy assigns waiting time when the candidate is listed with a program, even if he or she had begun dialysis or met other criteria for end-stage kidney failure before being listed.
Under the amended policy, once a person is accepted as a transplant candidate, waiting time will be calculated from the date the person first had a GFR score (a standard clinical measure of kidney function) less than or equal to 20 ml/minute, or when the candidate began dialysis or other renal replacement therapy, even if that date preceded the transplant listing.
Access for candidates with biological disadvantages
The revised policy will enhance access to transplantation for candidates with biological disadvantages including less common blood types and/or high immune system sensitivity.
The policy will facilitate kidney offers from donors with certain subtypes of blood type A for transplant candidates with blood type B. Some type B candidates are compatible with donors who have these specific subtypes.
The policy also creates a sliding scale of additional priority for candidates with an immune system sensitivity, measured in a percentage using a calculated panel reactive antibody (CPRA) score, beginning at 20 percent. Since extremely highly sensitized candidates (CPRA score of 98 percent or higher) have very few opportunities for a compatible transplant, they would receive higher proportional priority than those with more moderate sensitization levels.
Additional considerations
Upon implementation of the policy, local organ allocation areas will no longer owe "payback" kidney debts when a transplant center accepts a well-matched kidney offer from a different local donation service area. Research has not shown any definable benefit in recipient outcomes from payback offers.
A number of alternate kidney allocation systems currently operated in different local areas of the country will also end upon policy implementation. Many of these local systems were intended to study allocation methods now incorporated into the national policy proposal.

Tuesday, June 25, 2013

Summer School on Matching Problems, Markets, and Mechanisms: going on now in Budapest

(And don't miss the link to ruin pubs at the bottom...)

the first summer school of the COST project on Computational Social Choice

Monday, 24 June 2013

8:00-8:45 Registration

8:45-9:00 Opening

9:00-10:30 First tutorial of David Manlove

Hospitals / Residents problem and its variants

10:30-11:00 Coffee break

11:00-12:30 First tutorial of Tamás Fleiner

Two-sided problems with choice functions, matroids and lattices

12:30-14:00 Lunch break

14:00-15:30 First tutorial of Atila Abdulkadiroglu

School choice - Theory

15:30-16:00 Coffee break

16:00-17:30 Invited talk 1

Marina Nunez: Introduction to assignment games

18:30-21:30 Poster session with welcome reception

In the main building of Corvinus University of Budapest. Address: Budapest, Fővám tér 8., main hall. 33 posters will be presented.

Tuesday, 25 June 2013

9:00-10:30 Second tutorial of Tamás Fleiner

Generalised stable roommates problems

10:30-11:00 Coffee break

11:00-12:30 Second tutorial of Atila Abdulkadiroglu

Market design and recent issues in school choice

12:30-14:00 Lunch break

14:00-15:30 Second tutorial of David Manlove

The House Allocation problem (with applications to reviewer assignment)

15:30-16:00 Coffee break

16:00-17:30 Invited talk 2

Tamás Solymosi: The nucleolus and other core allocations in assignment games

Wednesday, 26 June 2013

9:00-10:30 Third tutorial of Atila Abdulkadiroglu

From design to evaluation to redesign

10:30-11:00 Coffee break

11:00-12:30 Third tutorial of David Manlove

Kidney exchange

12:30-14:00 Lunch break

14:00-15:30 Third tutorial of Tamás Fleiner

Stable allocations and flows

16:00-18:00 Facultative social program

Hiking to the Citadella (top of Gellért hill), or going to Gellért bath. Meeting after at 18:00 at the fountain in front of hotel Gellért.

18:30- Conference dinner

Thursday, 27 June 2013

9:00-10:30 Invited talk 3

Ildikó Schlotter: Parameterized complexity of some stable matching problems

10:30-11:00 Coffee break

11:00-12:30 Invited talk 4

Katarína Cechlárová: Computational complexity of competitive equilibria in exchange markets

12:30-14:00 Lunch break

14:00-15:30 Invited talk 5

Francis Bloch: Dynamic matching problems

15:30-16:00 Coffee break

16:00-17:30 Invited talk 6

Joana Pais: Experimental studies in matching markets

Friday, 28 June 2013

9:00-10:30 Invited talk 7

Szilvia Pápai: Matching with priorities

10:30-11:00 Coffee break

11:00-12:30 Invited talk 8

Estelle Cantillon: Preference formation in matching mechanisms

12:30-14:00 Lunch break

14:00-15:30 Invited talk 9

Lars Ehlers: Strategy-proofness in markets with indivisibilities

15:30-16:00 Coffee break

16:00-17:30 Invited talk 10

Dorothea Kuebler: University admissions in Germany: empirical and experimental evidence

Facultative social program

Visiting ruin pubs, meeting from 18:00 in Szimpla Kert

Courts and assisted suicide in Britain

Here is a judicial philosophy that seems hard to sympathize with: Lord Chief Justice won't allow 'personal sympathy' to sway decision on assisted suicide

"The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, said he and his fellow judges were “acutely aware of the desperate situation” faced by people such as Tony Nicklinson, the “locked-in” syndrome sufferer who starved himself to death last year after losing a right-to-die case.

"But he said “only basic principles of law” could decide whether or not there could ever be any relaxation of the ban on assisted suicide.

"He also challenged lawyers brandishing opinion poll findings pointing to strong public support for a change in the law, questioning how it was relevant, adding: “The public may change its mind next week.”

"He said the case could not be decided “on the basis of opinion polls”.

"Lord Judge was speaking as he, joined by the Master of the Rolls Lord Dyson and Lord Justice Elias, began to hear submissions as part of a wide ranging Court of Appeal challenge to the UK’s laws on euthanasia."

Monday, June 24, 2013

More unraveling in the private equity labor market

The NY Times is on the story: A Rush to Recruit Young Analysts, Only Months on the Job

"For Wall Street’s top young analysts, landing at a prestigious investment bank out of college was the easy part. Now comes the fierce competition to line up a high-paying job at a prominent buyout fund, just months into their first professional jobs.
"Traditionally, these jobs do not begin immediately but a year and a half later, after analysts finish their two-year contracts.
"One second-year analyst at a large bank said she had hardly been exposed to working in the finance world when the rush to find a job on the “buy side” began.

“There’s a progression that people go through,” she said. “You’re two months in, you start getting calls from recruiters, and you feel left out if you’re not participating. It’s a very enticing concept to lock up a job and your ticket out of banking a year and a half out.”
"Because they are trying to place analysts with such little work experience, recruiters will look for anything to identify the cream of the crop. College grade-point averages, high school test scores and community service are all fair game, Ms. Morgan said.
"Efforts have been made to push back a process that has been inching ahead, earlier and earlier. Last year, a handful of top-flight private equity funds including Blackstone, Carlyle and Warburg Pincus tried to delay recruiting until analysts were halfway through their second year, according to multiple private equity executives.

"The larger private equity funds waited, partly in response to big banks that were cracking down on recruiting. Goldman Sachs fired analysts who conceded they had lined up new positions in their first year, and Morgan Stanley banned first-year bankers from looking for new jobs, according to executives at both banks.

“There has been backlash,” said a former Goldman Sachs analyst who went through the recruiting process three years ago and is now an associate at a midmarket private equity fund. “You don’t really want your full investment banking analyst class checking out with a year and a half left on their contracts because they know they have another job lined up.”

"The banks were not concerned about losing talent but frustrated with the conflicts of interest that emerge after analysts pledge themselves to another employer.


“Once you have an offer, maybe you don’t want to work late nights three, four or five nights a week,” she said. “Maybe you don’t want to hop on every single live deal.”

"Morgan Stanley has since bowed to employee complaints, lifting its ban on first-year bankers’ job hunts this spring, according to two people briefed on the decision. Morgan Stanley declined to comment.


"The large buyout funds began ratcheting up recruitment drives last month, once again pursuing analysts in their first year.

"The funds that agreed to wait felt they had lost top employees to hedge funds and middle-market shops that aggressively recruited first-year analysts, said a private equity executive who oversees his firm’s hiring efforts.

“It’s back to a knife fight in an alley,” the executive said. “And it’s not fair because these kids get barely any on-the-job training before a recruiter reaches out to them. We should just be recruiting these kids out of middle school. Forget high school, college and Goldman Sachs.”

HT:: Eric Budish

Sunday, June 23, 2013

"דוקטור לשם כבוד" honorary doctorate at the Technion

When I was in Haifa to attend the conference in memory of Uri Rothblum (where I gave this talk), I was reminded that I used to visit often: for many years I was on the Board of Governors of the Technion.

And so, while I was there, I got an honorary degree, and planted a tree.

In Latin, an honorary doctorate is Doctor honoris causa, in Hebrew "דוקטור לשם כבוד" . (Doctor l'shem cavod, i.e. Doctor for the sake of honor...)

Here's an interview I did by phone with a reporter.
Here's a picture of the assembled cast.

(l-r) Prof. Alvin E. Roth; Elisha Yanay; Alfred J. Bar; Yoram Alster; J. Steven Emerson; Daniel Rose; Prof. Peretz Lavie, president of the Technion; Danny Yamin, Chairman of the Technion Council; Lawrence Jackier, Chairman of the Technion Board of Governors; Melvyn H. Bloom; Ilan Biran; and Prof. Jason L. Speyer.
June 10, 2013 
And here are me and Emilie next to the newly planted tree (the little one on the left, not the big one behind us...)

Update: here's the video of the honorary doctorate ceremonies. (It's long, but I did my best to keep in short, you can see me starting at 1:22:23--most of the applause is for brevity:)

And here is a much shorter video of the tree-planting ceremony, with President Peretz Lavie doing the honors, and Technion chemistry laureate Dan Schechtman and me planting the trees.

Friday, June 21, 2013

Witchcraft as a repugnant transaction in Indonesia?

Al Jazeera reports on efforts to ban witchcraft in Indonesia: Indonesia considers ban on witchcraft

"People accused of practising black magic in Indonesia could be jailed for five years if a revised criminal code is accepted by parliament.

"However, there is a lot of resistance to the proposed new law, as witchcraft is big business in the country."

In the United States and elsewhere, there are all sorts of laws and regulations about who may (and who may not) practice medicine, and I expected the story to be about efforts to ban witchdoctors on the grounds of practicing medicine without a license.  But the story suggests that at least some of the motivation for the ban comes from a feeling that witchcraft is effective...

Thursday, June 20, 2013

Kidney exchange about to begin in France?

The story (in French) is here: Dons croisés d'organe : c'est maintenant (ou presque) ! 

Here's Google translate:

"In France, the law authorizing donations cross between living persons of July 2011 and its implementing decree was published in the Official Journal in September 2012. With the development of matching software, the first cross-kidney donation could take place before the end of 2013. Experts expect twenty additional transplants per year in the country.
Organ donation called "crossover" allows a living person who has expressed its intention to grant the benefit of a receiver identified on hold, to be offered to participate in a cross organ donation in cases of medical incompatibility receiver initially selected. General ethical principles for donations and uses of elements and products of the human body must be met: consent to the collection, revocable at any time, free, anonymous; estimate of the risk / benefit of interventions and implementation of the system of health surveillance . That the pairing mechanism is put in place, there must be at least 50 "couples" of volunteers. The selection process is currently underway. Each donor should have a complete medical checkup. The "couples" then pass a special committee to verify the absence of coercion and financial dealings. The donor is heard by a court. Then the couples are reviewed by the National Center for allocating grafts, which decides on their eligibility or not the database pairs.
It must be the work of computerized winners of Nobel Prize in Economics in 2012 matching the Americans Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley. Their game theory has revolutionized the organization of cross donation for kidney transplantation in the United States by allowing the matching of thousands of donors and recipients of organs. It is estimated that about 2000 patients so far received a kidney through this system, without which they would not have been grafted.
On the occasion of the third day of the Biomedicine Agency, held in Paris on Thursday 30 and Friday, May 31, Marie-Alice Macher, the transplant center strategy, announced the start of the first cross donations, originally scheduled for last spring, was now imminent. "The matching software is ready, the agreements were signed with most departments of institutions, which must leave the operating room available in case of successful matching. The only thing we lack is a sufficient number of pairs of donors in the database, "she said. The logistics system is also heavy as to ensure the reciprocity of gifts, the two samples and two transplants must be performed simultaneously, requiring the mobilization of four operating theaters."

Wednesday, June 19, 2013

Compensating kidney donors with charitable contributions--Choi, Gulati and Posner

Organ shortages remain despite the increase in live donation that has accompanied kidney exchange. But it is illegal to pay donors, so there's an ongoing discussion of other ways to induce a greater supply.  Here's a proposal by Choi, Gulati and Posner...

Altruism Exchanges and the Kidney Shortage

Stephen J. Choi 

New York University School of Law

G. Mitu Gulati 

Duke University - School of Law

Eric A. Posner 

University of Chicago - Law School

January 16, 2013

University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 630
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 13-03 

Not enough kidneys are donated each year to satisfy the demand from patients who need them. Strong moral and legal norms interfere with market-based solutions. To improve the supply of kidneys without violating these norms, we propose legal reforms that would strengthen the incentive to donate based on altruistic motives. We propose that donors be permitted to donate kidneys in exchange for commitments by recipients or their benefactors to engage in charitable activity or to donate funds to charities chosen by donors. And we propose that charities be permitted to create Altruism Exchanges, which would permit large numbers of altruists to make charitable exchanges with each other, including but not limited to kidney donations. Altruism Exchanges would solve two significant problems with the current system of voluntary kidney donations: the risk of default and the lack of liquidity.

 HT: Alexander Berger

Tuesday, June 18, 2013

My graduation speech to Stanford economics grads, June 16, 2013

On Sunday I got to dress as Harry Potter and give the Stanford economics graduation speech (on matching and graduation) at Stanford's commencement exercises.

Monday, June 17, 2013

Non-directed kidney donation is up in the UK

Altruistic organ donations rise in UK almost three-fold

"The number of living people giving one of their organs to a stranger almost tripled last year in the UK, according to new figures.

The Human Tissue Authority (HTA) approved 104 so-called altruistic organ donations in 2012-13 compared with 38 the previous year."

Here are the UK statistics, and here is the page for the UK's kidney exchange program: Paired donation matching scheme

Sunday, June 16, 2013

Deceased organ donation and solicitation in Israel: video of my talk at the conference in memory of Jean Francois Mertens in Jerusalem

Here's a video of the talk I gave at the Center for Rationality conference in memory of Jean Francois Mertens on June 7 2013.

Saturday, June 15, 2013

An unusual blogging distinction, if it were true

Science writer Colin Schultz writing about Why Scientists Shouldn’t Be Afraid of Blogging and Social Media, presents a slide show that makes the following claim:

So this is Market Design. It’s written by Alvin Roth. Alvin stands as being, as far as I know, the only person with a Nobel prize who runs a blog. Alvin, along with Lloyd Shapley, won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences last year, and this was Alvin’s blog post that day.

I would count the Becker-Posner blog in this category too, but I can't tell whether Mr. Schultz overlooked it, or doesn't count it as what he thinks of as a blog...

Are there any others that you know of?

Friday, June 14, 2013

EC 13: ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, in Philadelphia, June 16-20 2013

EC 13, the 14th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, will be held in Philadelphia, at Penn.

There will be workshops the 16th and 17th, and the conference proper will be the 18-20th. Some of the sessions that may be of particular interest to readers of this blog are Monday June 17 tutorials on market design by Utku Unver from 9-12:30 and by Tayfun Sonmez from 2-5:30, a session on kidney exchange on Wednesday June 19 (chaired by Aaron Roth) from 10:20-11:20, my talk on kidney exchange on Thursday June 20 from 9-10:00, and a session on Matching (chaired by Itai Ashlagi) from 11:40-12:40. There are also a bunch of sessions on mechanism design, with and without money.

 Here's the program (and here are the abstracts):

Tuesday, June 18, 2013
8:45 - 9:00 AM
Keynote Talk I
Chair: Eva Tardos
9:00 - 10:00 AM
Cascading Behavior in Social and Economic Networks
Jon Kleinberg
10:20 - 11:20 AM
Session 2a: Mechanism Design I
Chair: Costis Daskalakis
Prior-Independent Auctions for Risk-Averse Agents
Hu Fu, Jason Hartline and Darrell Hoy
Prior-free Auctions for Budgeted Agents
Nikhil R Devanur, Bach Ha and Jason Hartline
On the Ratio of Revenue to Welfare in Single-Parameter Mechanism Design
Robert Kleinberg and Yang Yuan
Session 2b: Prediction Markets
Chair: David Pennock
Cost Function Market Makers for Measurable Spaces, 
Yiling Chen, Michael Ruberry and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
What You Jointly Know Determines How You Act --- Strategic Interactions in Prediction Markets
Xi Alice Gao, Jie Zhang and Yiling Chen
An Axiomatic Characterization of Adaptive-Liquidity Market Makers, 
Xiaolong Li and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
11:20 - 11:40 AMBreak
11:40 - 12:40 AM
Session 3a: Multidimensional Mechanism Design
Chair: Michal Feldman
Multi-parameter Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation, 
Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg and Aleksandrs Slivkins
Optimal Auctions via the Multiplicative Weight Method
Anand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi and Kamesh Munagala
The Menu-Size Complexity of Auctions
Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan

Session 3b: Ad Auctions I
Chair: Sébastien Lahaie
Real-time Optimization of Personalized Assortments
Negin Golrezaei, Hamid Nazerzadeh and Paat Rusmevichientong
A Dynamic Axiomatic Approach to First-Price Auctions, 
Darrell Hoy, Kamal Jain and Chris Wilkens
Competition Among Asymmetric Sellers With Fixed Supply
Uriel Feige, Ron Lavi and Moshe Tennenholtz
12:40 - 2:00 PMLunch
2:10 - 3:30 PM
Session 4: Online Auctions
Chair: Ron Lavi 
Ranking and Tradeoffs in Sponsored Search Auctions
Ben Roberts, Dinan Gunawardena, Ian Kash and Peter Key
Whole-page Optimization and Submodular Welfare Maximization with Online Bidders
Nikhil R Devanur, Nitish Korula, Zhiyi Huang, Vahab Mirrokni and Qiqi Yan

Peaches, Lemons, and Cookies: Designing Auction Markets with Dispersed Information
Ittai Abraham, Susan Athey, Moshe Babaioff and Michael Grubb
Auctions for Online Display Advertising Exchanges: Approximations and Design
Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
3:30 - 3:50 PMBreak
3:50 - 4:50 PM
Session 5a: Mechanism Design II
Chair: Jason Hartline
Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design 
Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan and Vasilis Syrgkanis
Near-Optimal Multi-Unit Auctions with Ordered Bidders
Sayan Bhattacharya, Elias Koutsoupias, Janardhan ,Kulkarni Stefano Leonardi, Tim Roughgarden and Xiaoming Xu
Truthfulness and Stochastic Dominance with Monetary Transfers
Martin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselhei and Berthold Voecking
Session 5b: Price of Anarchy and Incentives
Chair: Nikhil R. Devanur
Risk Sensitivity of Price of Anarchy under Uncertainty
Georgios Piliouras, Evdokia Nikolova and Jeff S. Shamma
Improved Bounds on the Price of Stability in Network Cost Sharing Games
Euiwoong Lee and Katrina Ligett

Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Envy-free Allocation Problem
Rodrigo Velez
4:55 - 6:15 PM
Session 6: Estimation and Forecasting
Chair: Michael Wellman
Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of "Bob the Broker"
Eric Budish and Aditya Bhave
Measuring the Performance of Large-Scale Combinatorial Auctions: A Structural Estimation Approach
Sang Won Kim, Marcelo Olivares and Gabriel Weintraub
When Do Noisy Votes Reveal the Truth? 
Ioannis Caragiannis Ariel Procaccia and Nisarg Shah
A Combinatorial Prediction Market for the U.S. Elections
Miroslav Dudik, Sébastien Lahaie, David Pennock and David Rothschild
6:15 - 7:00 PMBusiness Meeting
7:00 - 8:30 PM

Poster Session
Wednesday, June 19, 2013
9:00 - 10:00 AM
Session 7: Mechanism Design III
Chair: Moshe Babaioff

Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport
Costis Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum and Christos Tzamos
Optimal and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Truthful Mechanisms for Agents that Value Privacy
Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian Kash, Tal Moran and Salil Vadhan
10:00 - 10:20 AM
10:20 - 11:20 AM
Session 8a: Mechanism Design IV
Chair: Robert Kleinberg
Differential Pricing with Inequity Aversion in Social Networks
Noga Alon, Yishay Mansour and Moshe Tennenholtz
Approximation in Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
Yunan Li

Accounting for Price Dependencies in Simultaneous Sealed-Bid Auctions
Brandon Mayer, Eric Sodomka, Amy Greenwald and Michael Wellman

Session 8b: Kidney Exchange
Chair: Aaron Roth

Failure-Aware Kidney Exchange
John Dickerson, Ariel Procaccia and Tuomas Sandholm

Harnessing the Power of Two Crossmatches
Avrim Blum, Anupam Gupta, Ariel Procaccia and Ankit Sharma

Kidney Exchange in Dynamic Sparse Heterogenous PoolsItai Ashlagi, Patrick Jaillet and Vahideh Manshadi

11:20 - 11:40 AM
11:40 - 12:40 PM
Session 9a: Mechansim Design without Money I
Chair: Ariel Procaccia
Strategyproof Facility Location for Concave Cost Functions
Dimitris Fotakis and Christos Tzamos

Strategyproof Facility Location and the Least Squares Objective
Yoav Wilf and Michal Feldman

Loss Calibrated Methods for Bipartite Rationing
Herve Moulin and Jay Sethuraman

Session 9b: Public Goods and Networks
Chair: Arpita Ghosh
A Network Approach to Public Goods
Matt Elliott and Ben Golub

Empirical Agent Based Models of Cooperation in Public Goods GamesMichael Wunder, Siddharth Suri and Duncan Watts

Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale 
Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier and Renato Paes Leme
12:40 - 2:00 PM
2:00 - 3:20 PM
Session 10a: Social Networks
Chair: Jeff MacKie Mason 
Complex Contagion and the Weakness of Long Ties in Social Networks: Revisited
Roozbeh Ebrahimi, Golnaz Ghasemiesfeh and Jie Gao

Selection and Influence in Cultural Dynamics
David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren and Aleksandrs Slivkins
Incentives, Gamification, and Game Theory: An Economic Approach to Badge Design
David Easley and Arpita Ghosh

A Markov Chain Approximation to Choice ModelingJose Blanchet, Guillermo Gallego and Vineet Goyal

Session 10b: Complexity and Learning
Chair: Yishay Mansour 
Best-Response Dynamics Out of Sync
Roee Engelberg, Alex Fabrikant, Michael Schapira and David Wajc

The Empirical Implications of Rank in Bimatrix Games
Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Federico Echenique and Adam Wierman

Learning Equilibria of Games via Payoff QueriesRahul Savani, John Fearnley, Martin Gairing and Paul Goldberg
Super-Efficient Rational ProofsPablo Azar and Silvio Micali
3:20 - 3:50 PMBreak
3:50 - 4:50 PM
Session 11: Networks
Chair: Jon Kleinberg 
Selection Effects in Online Sharing: Consequences for Peer Adoption
Sean J Taylor, Eytan Bakshy and Sinan Aral

Bertrand Networks
Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier and Noam Nisan

Potential Games are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games
Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan, Jason Marden and Adam Wierman
6:00 - 10:00 PM

Conference Dinner
Thursday, June 20, 2013
Keynote Talk II
Chair: Preston McAfee
9:00 -10:00 AM
Kidney Exchange: Where We’ve Been and Where We Can Go From Here Alvin E. Roth
10:00 -10:20 AMBreak
10:20 - 11:20 AM
Session 13: Mechanism Design without Money II
Chair: Mallesh Pai

Unbalanced Random Matching Markets
Itai Ashlagi, Yashodhan Kanoria and Jacob Leshno

Existence of Stable Matchings in Large Markets with Complementarities

Eduardo Azevedo and John Hatfield

Mechanism Design for Fair Division
Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis and Gagan Goel
11:20 - 11:40 AMBreak
11:40 - 12:40 AM
Session 14a: Ad Auctions II
Chair: Noam Nisan

Budget Smoothing for Internet Ad Auctions: A Game Theoretic Approach
Denis Charles, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Max Chickering, Nikhil R Devanur and Lei Wang
Revenue Optimization in the Generalized Second-Price Auction
David Thompson and Kevin Leyton-Brown
Auctions with Unique Equilibria
Shuchi Chawla and Jason Hartline
Session 14b: Matching
Chair: Itai Ashlagi

Designing for Diversity in Matching

Scott D Kominers and Tayfun Sonmez

Two-Sided Matching with Partial Information
Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Nicole Immorlica and Kevin Leyton-Brown

House Allocation with Indifferences: A Generalization and a Unified View
Daniela Saban and Jay Sethuraman
12:40 - 2:00 PMLunch
2:10 - 3:30 PM
Session 15a: Crowd Sourcing in networks
Chair: Jenn Wortman Vaughan

Sybil-proof Mechanisms in Query Incentive Networks
Wei Chen, Wang Yajun, Dongxiao Yu and Li Zhang
On Discrete Preferences and CoordinationFlavio Chierichetti, Jon Kleinberg and Sigal Oren

Incentivizing Participation in Online Forums for Education
Arpita Ghosh and Jon Kleinberg

Privacy and Coordination: Computing on Databases with Endogenous Participation
Arpita Ghosh and Katrina Ligett

Session 15b: Online experience
Chair: Siddharth Suri

Pick Your Poison: Pricing and Inventories at Unlicensed Online Pharmacies
Nektarios Leontiadis, Tyler Moore and Nicolas Christin
Down-to-the-Minute Effects of Super Bowl Advertising on Online Search Behavior
Randall A Lewis and David Reiley

Optimizing Password Composition Policies
Jeremiah M Blocki, Saranga Komanduri, Ariel Procaccia and Or Sheffet

Latency Arbitrage, Market Fragmentation, and Efficiency: A Two-Market Model
Elaine Wah and Michael Wellman
3:30 - 3:50 PMBreak
3:50 - 4:50 PM
Session 16: Information and Networks
Chair: Nicole Immorlica

Robust Incentives for Information Acquisition, 
Gabriel Carroll
Social Learning and Aggregate Network Uncertainty
Ilan Lobel and Evan Sadler

Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd"
Ilan Kremer, Yishay Mansour and Motty Perry

4:50 PMEnd